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Abstract in English 
 
We develop four scenarios for the future of finance. Our scenarios differ in two dimensions. 
First, to what extent soft information lies at the core of banks’ business. Second, to what extent 
scope economies exist between different banking activities. By combining these two 
dimensions, we obtain four scenarios: Isolated Islands, Big Banks, Competing Conglomerates, 
and Flat Finance. Market structure, market failures, and government failures vary between 
scenarios. These differences then translate into differences in the complexity of balance sheets, 
the ability to coordinate policy internationally, the information gap faced by regulators, the size 
of banks’ balance sheets, the tradability of banks’ assets, the level of interconnectedness, the 
potential for market discipline, and the threat of regulatory capture. As a result, each scenario 
calls for a different set of policies to combat systemic risk. 
 
Key words: Financial sector, systemic risk, regulation, scenario study 
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Abstract in Dutch 
 
We ontwikkelen vier scenario’s voor de toekomst van de financiële sector. De scenario’s 
verschillen in twee dimensies. Ten eerste, in welke mate zachte informatie aan de basis van het 
business model van banken ligt. Ten tweede, in welke mate er synergie bestaat tussen 
verschillende bancaire activiteiten. Door deze twee dimensies te combineren, krijgen we vier 
scenario’s: Islands, Big Banks, Competing Conglomerates, and Flat Finance. Marktstructuur, 
marktfalen, en overheidsfalen verschillen tussen de scenario’s. Deze verschillen vertalen zich in 
variatie in de complexiteit van de bankbalans, de mate waarin internationale coördinatie van 
beleid tot stand komt, de informatieachterstand van toezichthouders ten opzichte van banken, de 
grootte van banken, de mate van internationale verwevenheid, de effectiviteit van 
marktdiscipline, en de kans op regulatory capture. Hierdoor hangt de effectiviteit van 
beleidsinstrumenten om systeemrisico in te perken af van het scenario. 
 
Steekwoorden: financiële sector, systeemrisico, regulering, scenariostudie 
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This document presents four scenarios for the future of finance. The goal of our study is to 
imagine the future of finance and to identify challenges faced by policymakers in fighting 
systemic risk. It builds upon a tradition within the CPB to develop scenarios for policy analysis.  
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Summary 
In this study, we present four scenarios that aim to imagine the future of finance in 20 years’ 
time and try to identify the main challenges faced by policymakers in reducing systemic risk. In 
this respect, our study complements other scenario studies such as a recent Dutch Central Bank 
study (DNB, 2009), which ‘aims at providing a fact-based review of developments that have 
taken place since the crisis erupted and that are relevant for Dutch financial institutions.’ In 
addition, whereas an important dimension in their scenario is the speed and type of recovery of 
the real economy, we focus on the role that financial intermediaries play vis-à-vis markets.  
The scenarios that we present differ in two dimensions. The first dimension refers to the 
type of information – hard or soft – lying at the core of banks’ business models. Examples of 
hard information are data on a client’s credit history, cash flow realisation, revenue, 
investments, liabilities etc. A bank can credibly transfer such information to other banks or 
investors. These outside parties can then base their commercial decisions on this information. In 
contrast, soft information cannot credibly be transferred to other banks or investors. Examples 
are an assessment of creditworthiness based on a relationship of mutual trust between an 
account manager and his client, or intimate knowledge of the day-to-day operations within a 
particular firm. Such information only has value to the bank that generates it. The second 
dimension is to what extent scope economies exist between different banking activities, i.e., 
whether banks specialize or form conglomerates. As depicted in figure 1 below, by combining 
these two dimensions we obtain four scenarios: isolated islands, big banks, flat finance, and 
competing conglomerates.  















The first dimension of our scenarios arises because future developments in information and 
communication technology (ICT) can have two opposite effects. On the one hand, they may 
allow banks and potential borrowers to generate more hard information, which can be processed   10 
in statistical models. Long-term relationships matter less, informational frictions in direct credit 
markets are reduced, and banks focus on reducing remaining frictions. On the other hand, 
technological developments may also help banks in generating more soft information. In that 
case, banks will focus on fostering long-term relationships. The value of a bank’s assets will 
depend on soft, non-transferable information and outsiders have difficulties assessing their 
quality. In this sense, assets will become more informationally opaque. 
The second dimension of our scenarios arises because future developments in ICT may 
increase economies of scope in the banking sector, but may also increase the potential to use 
contractual means, such as outsourcing or partnerships, to achieve particular synergies between 
different activities. The latter will induce specialisation.  
Important variations between scenarios concern the complexity and size of balance sheets, , 
the tradability of banks’ assets, the level of interconnectedness, the potential for market 
discipline, the threat of regulatory capture, the ability to coordinate policy internationally, and 
the information gap faced by regulators These variations lead to differences in market structure, 
the importance of market failures, and the extent of government failures. As a result, policies to 
mitigate market and government failures will differ between scenarios.  
Market structure 
Figure 2 and 3 illustrate how market structure differs between the scenarios. In Isolated Islands, 
banks specialize because economies of scope are absent. They invest heavily in their 
relationship with their clients because this generates the soft information that is the key to a 
bank’s success. To generate soft information, banks have to stay in close contact with their 
clients, which gives rise to a local orientation. A local orientation also implies that scale matters 
less. In addition, competition is muted because bank clients are locked in due to the absence of 
hard information on their credit status. To fund their activities, banks depend heavily on deposit 
funding. Funding in the interbank wholesale markets is difficult because assets are opaque and 
therefore have relatively little collateral value.  
In Big Banks, soft information still plays a central role. In contrast with Isolated Islands, 
however, scope economies are important. Banks offer their clients a complete and functionally 
integrated set of products and services. As a result, banks’ balance sheets contain a diversity of 
assets and are more complex. When customers need a particular service, they will first turn to 
the bank from which they already buy several products. This creates an additional lock-in 
effect, which reduces competition even further.   11 
































In Competing Conglomerates, scope economies are important, but now hard information is 
abundant, which reduces the importance of soft information. As a result, bank assets are less 
informationally opaque: third parties can more accurately determine the value of these assets by 
using hard, transferable information. This makes banks’ assets more liquid. As a result, 
securitisation is easier, which allows banks to finance themselves more easily through 
wholesale markets, thus reducing their reliance on deposit funding. Because banks can select 
and monitor clients based on hard information, distance matters less. Consequently, banks are 
footloose and can serve their clients from anywhere in the world. For some services and 
products, consumers and firms can turn directly to markets. For these activities, banks compete 
head-on with markets and economies of scale become more important.  
In Flat Finance, finally, hard information remains abundant, but scope economies are absent. 
This implies that large international banks specialize for example in investment services or 
retail internet banking. Clients can easily change banks, as information on their creditworthiness 
is credible and transferable to other banks, while they are not restricted to buying package deals. 
As a result, banks that operate in a particular market segment compete fiercely. 
It may be tempting to identify existing banks that fit a particular scenario. However, a 
particular scenario reflects a whole ecosystem of banks, i.e., retail banks, corporate banks, 
investment banks, hedge funds, money market mutual funds, special purpose investment 
vehicles etc. If one wants to think of our future scenarios in terms of the current world, it is best 
to think in terms of countries or regions. For example, although one should not take such 
comparisons too seriously, Isolated Island may be compared to Germany, big banks may be 
compared to Japan, competing conglomerates may be compared to Europe, and flat finance may 
be compared to the United States.    12 
































Market and government failures  
Because the economics that drives market structure differ between scenarios, the severity of 
market failures and government failures will also differ. The market failures that differentiate 
banks from non-financial firms such as car manufacturers are twofold. First, shareholders’ 
limited liability creates an incentive to shift risk to small creditors (i.e., depositors) who are 
unable to monitor and intervene to discipline banks. Here, banks and car manufactures differ 
because the latter usually have a few large creditors. Second, one bank’s risk-taking decisions 
have negative external effects for other banks due to contagion. Interconnectedness (for 
example through cross holding of deposits, credit lines, or interbank lending) or information 
spillovers (for example through perceived correlations in risks, assets values, or the quality of 
regulation) can cause one bank’s problems to affect other banks as well. In contrast, the failure 
of a car manufacturer has no such negative consequences for its competitors. 
Government failure arises when government intervention introduces a new inefficiency. In 
the context of bank regulation, we distinguish between three forms of failure: capture, lack of 
commitment, and coordination failure. Capture arises when a regulator puts the interests of the 
sector above those of society. Commitment is problematic when a conflict exists between ex 
ante and ex post goals and regulators can not credibly commit themselves to a particular course 
of action. Coordination failures can arise if free-riding effects exist among regulators. 
Figure 4 and 5 summarize the market failures and government failures in the four scenarios. 
In Isolated Islands, debt and equity holders have difficulties monitoring the probability of losing 
their money because banks have private information about the value of their assets, 
interconnectedness is rather low, because banks hold their assets to maturity and fund 
themselves through deposits. The potential for information spillovers is somewhat larger 
because banks’ assets are relatively opaque. Coordination is relatively easy due to banks local 
orientation, while governments are able to commit themselves not to bail-out small banks. .   13 
Although capture is much less probable than in other scenarios, it remains a potential issue 
because of the information gap between regulator and regulated..  
In Big Banks, interconnectedness is rather low, as in Isolated Islands. A difference is that, 
debt holders have even more difficulties monitoring banks, because banks’ balance sheets are so 
complex. For the same reason, the potential for information spillovers is also larger. As in 
Isolated Islands, coordination is feasible because banks are local. Commitment, however, is 
more difficult due to banks’ size. Capture is particularly problematic in this scenario because 
the regulator faces bigger banks as well as a larger information gap. 






















In Competing Conglomerates, assets are less informationally opaque. Therefore, debt and 
equity holders can more easily monitor banks. In addition, banks fund themselves to a larger 
extent through wholesale markets. This improves banks’ corporate governance. Competing 
Conglomerates has a high probability of capture, because balance sheets are complex. In 
addition, commitment and coordination are central issues because banks are footloose and large.  
Flat Finance combines a high degree of interconnectedness with effective corporate 
governance and limited informational spillovers. Flat Finance scores badly on coordination. It 
scores relatively well on capture because information asymmetry is limited. Commitment 
remains an important issue because of the size of banks, but also because banks may be too-
interconnected-to-fail.   14 























Our scenarios translate into policy challenges that vary across scenarios. We distinguish 
between four categories of policy challenges. First, how should we monitor financial 
instability? If banks are local, we should focus on local risks because these matter most. When 
soft information matters, market information will signal trust and reputation. In case bank assets 
are opaque, information spillovers are an important source of instability. If banks are able to 
securitize and sell their assets, then interconnectedness will play an important role.  
Second, how should we reduce government failure? If government failure is rather mild, 
transparent reporting suffices. In other cases, more drastic measures such as splitting monitoring 
and intervention, arranging external visitations, or preventing long-term relationships may be 
called for. Market information can also be useful in reducing government failure if it can be 
used as an independent indicator of risk.  
Third, what type of ex ante prudential regulation should be in place? If regulators are at an 
informational disadvantage, regulation that requires complex information will be less effective. 
Simple indicators that trigger close scrutiny may be a useful complement in that case. When 
information is hard, regulation that uses market forces to discipline banks may play an 
important role. 
Finally, how should regulators intervene ex post, i.e., once potential threats to financial 
stability have materialized? When banks are big and systemic crisis difficult to predict, it may 
help to separate out crucial banking functions. In that case, it is also crucial to introduce bank-
specific bankruptcy law. Table 1 below summarizes the policy challenges in each scenario. 
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Table 1  Policy challenges 




Ex ante prudential 
supervision 
Ex post crisis 
management  
         
II  * Focus on local risks, 
correlated exposures,  
information spillovers 
* Monitor different types 
of financial institutions 
* Market information as 
indicator of trust 
* Transparent reporting by 
regulator (see FDIC)  
 
* Complement incentive 
regulation with simple 
indicators that trigger 
close scrutiny 
* Guarantee independent 
board 
* PCA works well  
* Facilitate crisis 
funding for SMEs 
         
BB  * Focus on local risks, 
correlated exposures, 
information spillovers 
* Use information other 
local banks 
* Market information as 
indicator of trust 
* Split monitoring and 
intervention 
* Arrange external 
visitation 
* Prevent long-term 
relation between regulator 
and banks 
* Use simple indicators 
that trigger close scrutiny 
* Guarantee independent 
board 
* Put more emphasis on 
quantitative restrictions 
* Adapt PCA to large 
national banks 
* Facilitate crisis 
funding for SMEs 
         
CC  * International 
monitoring of macro and 
micro exposure 
important 
* Focus on information 
spillovers  
* Design markets to 
generate information on 
systemic risk 
* Use institutional design 
to reduce probability of 
capture (see Big Banks) 
* Use market information 
to trigger intervention 
* Act unilaterally  
* Make banks ‘more local’ 
* Devise mechanisms to 
punish deviating countries 
* Price systemic risk,  
* Complement pricing with 
quantitative restrictions. 
* Use market discipline 
* Regulate incentive 
schemes 
* Adapt PCA to large 
international banks  
* Isolate crucial 
banking functions 
from crisis  




* Introduce bank- 
specific bankruptcy 
law 
         
FF  * International 
monitoring of macro and 
micro exposure 
important 
* Focus on 
interconnectedness  
* Focus on activities 
instead of institutions 
* Design markets to 
generate information on 
systemic risk 
* Use institutional design 
to reduce probability of 
capture (see Big Banks) 
* Use market information 
to trigger intervention  
* Act unilaterally  
* Make banks ‘more local’ 
* Devise mechanisms to 
punish deviating countries 
* Price systemic risk 
* Use market discipline 
* Regulate incentive 
schemes 
* Adapt PCA to large 
international banks  
* Isolate crucial 
banking functions 
from crisis 









The challenges that policymakers face give rise to several generic lessons. First, improved 
financial infrastructure may help by reducing market frictions and improving the robustness of 
payment systems in case of systemic shocks. In addition, countries may not succeed in 
coordinating policy due to free riding effects. These allow one country to attract profitable   16 
business by lowering regulatory standards. Furthermore, policies that aim at reducing systemic 
risk can only be effective if they deal with government failure at the same time. Also, ex post 
measures may be more effective than ex ante regulation in situations where ex ante risks are 
very hard to manage. Finally, Governments should prepare to cope with big foreign banks in a 
world where banks are international and footloose. 
A scenario study helps to prepare for an unknown future. Of course, our scenarios are 
necessarily an oversimplification of reality. We present extremes, where reality will be 
somewhere in the middle. We have focused on two particular dimensions, thereby neglecting 
other developments that may be important. We contrast scenarios with each other, where 
different scenarios in reality perhaps co-exist in different parts of the financial sector. In spite of 
all these limitations, we think that our scenarios provide a useful exploration of the future of 
finance and the implications for policymakers.  17 
1  Introduction 
Several forces have been gradually changing the structure of the financial sector over the last 
decades, and will continue to do so. First, advances in information technology have made 
storing and retrieving data cheap and reliable, and collecting and processing information fast 
and easy. This has reduced transaction costs and increased the availability of verifiable, hard 
information. Second, globalisation has resulted in larger and more diverse markets in which 
banks operate. As a result, the profits from outperforming competitors have increased and 
performance pay has become a central instrument to attract and retain highly-talented 
employees. Third, changes in regulation have levelled the international playing field, enabling 
banks to offer a wider range of services, and stimulating international expansion. 
On top of these gradual changes, the events of 2007-2008 created an abrupt shock. Before 
the near implosion of the financial system, both banks and regulators had a reputation for 
trustworthiness and solidity, and, as a result, a systemic crisis was deemed extremely unlikely. 
Such a crisis threatens the economy by interfering with banks’ crucial role in reducing frictions 
in financial markets. Indeed, banks provide the bulk of credit financing in the economy, even 
though lenders can also provide credit to borrowers directly through financial markets.
1  
The financial crisis has changed the optimistic beliefs and expectations of market 
participants, regulators, and politicians. We now know that developments such as securitisation, 
growing leverage, increased interconnectedness, growing reliance on short-term funding, 
ballooning balance sheets, the fee-based business model of credit rating agencies, and high 
bonuses for short-term performance had substantially increased the risk of a systemic crisis. The 
crisis also showed that regulators overlooked – and may even have contributed to - serious risks 
to the financial system. In response, policymakers are seeking to reform financial sector 
regulation. Many of these reforms are expected to materialize within the next five years. 
This combination of an abrupt shock on top of gradual change raises the question: what will 
the financial intermediary sector look like when the dust has settled in, say, twenty years time? 
In response to increasingly global markets, advancing technology, and changing regulation, 
financial intermediaries will decide, for example, whether to merge, what products to sell, how 
to fund their activities and how structure their corporate governance. These choices will 
determine the structure of the financial sector. But what drives these decisions? From an 
economic point of view, the costs and benefits of the choices banks make depend on the 
economic determinants of the added value of intermediaries relative to markets, the market 
failures that play a role in the financial sector, and the government failures that limit the 
effectiveness of regulation. 
To study the future of financial intermediation, we formulate four scenarios. We arrive at 
these scenarios by combining two dimensions. The first dimension is the level of specialisation: 
 
1 We will simply refer to financial intermediaries as banks, although the former also includes hedge funds, private equity, 
money market mutual funds, commercial banks, corporate banks and investment banks.   18 
will universal banks compete in bundles of products, or will specialized financial intermediaries 
compete in segmented markets? The second dimension is the importance of soft, private 
information in banking: will banks live in a world where distance is unimportant, securitisation 
is easy, banks compete fiercely with each other, and banks and markets are substitutes; or in a 
world where distance matters, securitisation is difficult, competition between banks is muted, 
and bank and markets are complements? As depicted in figure 1.1, by combining these two 
dimensions, we get four scenarios: Isolated Islands, Big Banks, Competing Conglomerates, and 
Flat Finance.  















In the first two scenarios, Isolated Islands and Big Banks, distance matters and information 
asymmetry is important. Consequently, securitisation is relatively difficult and banks have 
strong local ties. In the Isolated Islands scenario, scope economies are unimportant. In this 
scenario, financial intermediaries specialize and compete in segmented markets. In contrast, in 
the Big Banks scenario, scope economies are important. The result is a world where universal 
banks with strong local ties offer their clients bundles of product. 
In the other two scenarios, Competing Conglomerates and Flat Finance, information 
asymmetries are smaller and financial markets play a more important role. As a consequence, 
banks are no longer the only source of financing, securitisation is relatively easy, and distance is 
less important. Banks can thus easily relocate their headquarters or businesses to another 
country. In the Competing Conglomerates scenario, economies of scope do matter. Large 
financial firms compete on a global scale. In the Flat Finance scenario, on the other hand, 
economies of scope are absent. Hence, financial intermediaries specialize, while they operate 
globally. 
We justify these scenarios by arguing that advances in information technology can either 
raise or lower the level of soft, private information that banks have, and can either increase or 
decrease the importance of economies of scope.   19 
Advances in information technology can have two opposite effects on the level of information 
asymmetry. On the one hand, improved information technology can be used to generate more 
hard information. For example, data generated by cash management software, electronic 
payment systems or credit rating agencies allows firms to more credibly convey their credit 
history to financiers. This may reduce the bank-specific nature of the relationship between a 
firm, if soft information becomes less important, which allows borrowers to switch banks more 
easily. It also allows banks to securitise a larger fraction of their assets, because it will become 
easier to assess the quality of bundles of securitised loans. On the other hand, improved 
information technology may also be used to generate more soft information and to make better 
use of it. A bank’s long-term relationship with a client generates soft information on a client’s 
creditworthiness and valuable bank-specific skills to manage this client. To optimally extract 
and use such information, however, banks’ account managers have to be close to their clients. 
As a result, geographical distance matters. In addition, competition for existing clients becomes 
less fierce, but competition for first-time clients increases.  
Improving information technology may also have two opposing effects on the importance of 
economies of scope. The importance of such economies of scope determines what services 
banks offer their clients. On the one hand, improved information technology may allow 
financial intermediaries to better reap the benefits of economies of scope between different 
services. Data mining may allow banks to approach their customers with tailor-made business 
proposals. Once banks have built an expensive IT infrastructure, they can use it to sell many 
different products. An assessment of a clients’ creditworthiness may also provide information 
about cross selling opportunities. On the other hand, information technology creates more scope 
to arrive at optimal outcomes through contractual relations. Banks can sell information on 
customers to for example insurers who can then approach this customer. This reduces the 
advantage of conglomerates, and forces banks to focus on core activities instead. 
Of course, our scenarios represent the extremes of a continuum of possibilities. We focus on 
these extremes to make the distinctions between them, as well as the consequence of these 
differences for policy, as clear as possible. From a policy perspective, our four scenarios differ 
in several important ways.  
First, the extent to which international policy coordination is possible differs per scenario. If 
banks are footloose, policy coordination will be more difficult because banks can credibly 
threaten to move their business to other countries.  
Second, the importance and scope of systemic regulation differs per scenario. The ability of 
financial intermediaries to fund themselves by issuing securities determines the length of 
intermediation chains. Longer chains increase interconnectedness and therefore systemic risk. 
The ability to offload assets quickly also increases moral hazard. To protect themselves against 
increased moral hazard, banks’ financiers will prefer to provide short-term funding, which again 
increases systemic risk. Cross border activities and conglomeration also help to diversify   20 
against liquidity shocks. In the absence of such natural diversification, banks will enter into 
contracts with other financial intermediaries to compensate. 
Third, the extent of information asymmetry between regulator and regulated differs per 
scenario. This determines how effective regulation that requires complex information is. If 
banks form conglomerates or can quickly offload or hedge assets, intransparency increases and 
regulators will find it harder to assess a bank’s risk. In addition, if soft information is needed to 
monitor the credit risk of assets, the information asymmetry between bank and regulator also 
increases.  
Fourth, how effective banks’ financiers can monitor and discipline banks determines how 
useful markets can be in creating information for regulators and in reducing the risks. Market-
based financial intermediation, i.e., where banks depend on markets for their funding and not 
solely on deposits, increases market discipline. In addition, markets are better able to monitor 
and thus discipline specialized banks, compared to complex financial conglomerates. 
The structure of this document is as follows. In chapter two, we briefly describe the 
determinants of banks’ strategic choices. We discuss why banks have a competitive advantage 
over markets in intermediating between lenders and borrowers. In addition, we examine the 
market failures and government failures that play an important role in the financial sector. In 
section 3, we discuss important pre crisis developments in the financial sector. We argue that 
information technology is an important driver of most of these developments. Section 2 and 
section 3 form the background for the main part of this study: section 4 and section 5. In section 
4 we introduce our scenarios and discus the differences between them with respect to market 
structure, market failures, and government failures. In section 5 we discuss the challenges faced 
by policymakers in each of these scenarios. Section 6 concludes.  
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2  Determinants of banks’ strategic choices 
In reaction to technological change, globalisation and deregulation, banks’ strategic choices 
have reshaped the financial sector. Transactions have become more arms length, allowing 
broader participation in financial markets and increased diversification of risks. Financial 
markets and financial intermediaries have become increasingly intertwined. Banks competed 
fiercely for talent in global markets. These developments also drive the securitisation of bank 
loans and the increased reliance of banks on short-term financing through money markets.  
To understand how future developments may affect the strategic choices that banks make, 
and thus to make an educated guess at relevant future scenarios, we have to understand what 
determines the costs and benefits of these choices. This is a very difficult question. But to 
develop scenarios for the future of the financial sector we have to provide an answer. 
For the purposes of this document, we focus on three factors that play an important role in 
determining banks’ strategic choices. In section 2.1, we discuss the economics of financial 
intermediation. What is the added value of financial intermediation over intermediation through 
markets? One answer is that financial intermediaries exist due to economies of scale in reducing 
frictions in financial markets. This competitive advantage determines the boundary between 
banks and markets. A second answer is that banks benefit from their ability to forge long-term 
relationships with their clients, which allows them to generate and use soft, non-contractible 
information. A third answer is economies of scope, which determine what services banks decide 
to offer and the potential for cross-subsidisation between these services. Our scenarios will 
build upon these three ingredients, by arguing, first, that future developments can either reduce 
the competitive advantage of banks over markets or increase the importance of soft information, 
and, second, that future developments can either increase or reduce economies of scope. 
In section 2.2 we discuss the market failures that plague the financial intermediary sector. 
These market failures form the rationale for regulation of the financial sector. These determine 
what the most important risks for the financial sector are. Are they due to contagious bank runs, 
an opaque network of interconnections, or risk shifting by banks’ shareholders? Our scenarios 
will differ as to which market failure is most important, and, consequently, as to what policy 
measures are most effective. 
Finally, in section 2.3, we discuss the government failures that limit the effectiveness of 
regulation: the potential for capture, the absence of commitment and a lack of coordination. 
These government failures determine the limits of what government intervention may achieve, 
but also how much attention should be paid to the age-old question: who monitors the monitor. 
Again, our scenarios will differ as to which government failure is most important.  
Note that in our discussion, we do not intend to provide an in-depth overview of the relevant 
literature.
2 Those interested in more detail on different theories of intermediation can consult 
the following reviews of the literature: Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993), Bhattacharya et al 
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(1998), Gorton and Winton (2003), Freixas and Rochet (2008), Allen and Carletti (2008), and 
Boot and Thakor (2008). 
2.1  Banks versus markets 
2.1.1  Reducing informational frictions 
 
The financial system, consisting of banks and financial markets, channels funds into productive 
activities. The providers of these funds are mainly households and firms. The borrowers of 
these funds are firms, governments and households. Funds can flow from providers to 
borrowers in two ways: directly, through financial markets such as money markets, bond 
markets, or equity markets, or indirectly through a financial intermediary, such as banks, money 
market funds, pension funds, and insurers.  
Banks offer loans to firms that want to invest and offer consumers the possibility to deposit 
savings for future use. But markets could in principle also offer these services. If markets were 
complete and efficient, financial markets could provide the same services as banks do. In that 
perfect world, banks would be redundant. In the words of Freixas and Rochet (2008): ‘Banks 
are useless in an Arrow-Debreu world’.  
To understand why banks exist, we should understand why banks have a comparative 
advantage over markets in providing these services. Financial markets are plagued by 
information asymmetry. Consumers and firms have private information about shocks to their 
liquidity needs. Borrowers have private information about their investments and are subject to 
moral hazard. Lenders and borrowers have difficulties in addressing these information 
asymmetries because markets for information exhibit free riding and economies of scale. The 
literature on financial intermediation argues that banks are a way to overcome these 
informational problems. The costs of adverse selection can be reduced if borrowers form 
coalitions, which in the literature is seen as an abstract way to define a financial intermediary. 
Investors can address moral hazard by appointing a delegated monitor. Banks can aggregate the 
liquidity needs of firms and consumers. 
Delegated monitors 
One line of thought in the literature is that banks act as delegated monitors to investors. Why 
would investors need to be monitored? Once firms have obtained external funds, they can 
choose actions that are privately profitable but costly to their financiers. For example, they may 
allocate too little time or too little effort to cutting costs or internal control, may invest in pet 
projects instead of the most profitable ones, or spend effort on entrenchment strategies to secure 
their position. In other words, borrowers are subject to moral hazard.
3 
 
3 Alternatively one may assume that these actions can be observed, but only at a cost. This is know in the literature as 
costely state verification. Banks can then punish or audit borrowers if they fail to meet contractual obligations.    23 
Firms with sufficient own funds can credibly commit not to engage in such opportunistic 
behaviour by investing enough of their own money in the project (Tirole, 2006). In this way, 
they have a stake in their own investment project that provides an incentive not to engage in 
moral hazard. Investors do not have to worry that such a firm will misbehave once it has 
obtained a loan. Cash-rich firms can therefore obtain funding directly from financial markets, 
for example by issuing bonds or shares, without having to turn to banks. 
Firms that lack sufficient funds, however, will not be able to obtain such direct financing. 
These firms can only obtain external financing if they somehow reduce the scope for moral 
hazard. This is achieved if someone monitors their behaviour and punishes them for 
misbehaviour.  
In principle, investors could monitor firms themselves. If economies of scale in monitoring 
exist, however, they can save on monitoring costs by delegating monitoring to banks. This 
avoids duplication of auditing or monitoring costs by all lenders and naturally leads to 
economies of scale in the provision of monitoring services (Diamond, 1984). Banks reduce the 
scope for opportunistic behaviour by auditing borrowers and punish borrowers if they fail to 
meet contractual obligations. This allows cash constrained firms to obtain external financing 
and engage in profitable investments.  
An alternative view is that monitoring has the characteristics of a public good. If monitoring 
improves a firm’s performance by reducing moral hazard, other stakeholders in that firm, such 
as investors, employees or customers, benefit. In addition, purchasers of information may be 
able to share or resell their information to others, without diminishing its usefulness to 
themselves. A monitor generating information on the quality of potential investments may then 
be able to appropriate only a fraction of what buyers in total would be willing to pay. In a 
market context, efforts of speculators to use their information may be self defeating, because 
market prices adjust too quickly to new information. This prevents speculators from profiting 
from their information gathering efforts (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). Thus monitoring is 
especially prone to free riding.
4 To solve this problem, they hire a delegated monitor to do the 
monitoring for them. 
Information sharing 
A second theory views banks as information sharing coalitions. The information sharing theory 
of intermediation originates from a classic paper on signalling by Leland and Pyle (1977). 
Suppose that firms have private information about the quality of an investment project. To 
obtain financing, they need to convince the market that their project is worth investing in. By 
putting some of their own wealth at stake, individual firms can signal the quality of their project 
to potential investors. If the cost of mimicking this behaviour is too high for a firm with ‘bad’ 
projects, such an investment serves as a credible signal of the quality of the project. 
 
4 In addition, the information generated through monitoring can be disseminated to other investors at a very low cost. This 
implies that monitoring is associated with economies of scale.   24 
Suppose now that several entrepreneurs each have their own investment project. If the 
probabilities of their projects succeeding are uncorrelated, entrepreneurs with good projects can 
reduce total signalling costs by forming a coalition, because diversification then reduces 
uncertainty about the outcome (Diamond, 1984).
5 
Diversifying liquidity needs 
Finally, banks can be seen as pools of liquidity that allow consumers and firms to smooth their 
liquidity needs. Firms and consumers may unexpectedly need funds. For example, an 
unanticipated investment opportunity may present itself, equipment may brake down, and 
people may get sick or face unemployment. Thus, firms and consumers experience idiosyncratic 
shocks to their liquidity needs and therefore want to hold funds to accommodate these needs. 
They hoard liquid assets in order to insure against such shocks. This is costly when long-term 
investments have higher returns than short-term ones. If consumers and firms self-provide 
liquidity, resources are wasted because short-term assets are held, but a liquidity shock does not 
always occur. When the shocks to firms’ and consumers’ liquidity needs are not perfectly 
correlated, pooling will reduce the amount of low-yield investments required to satisfy these 
liquidity needs. This creates economies of scale in the provision of liquidity.  
Consumers can use money market funds or a bond market to pool their liquidity needs. For 
this, they do not need banks. These pools of liquidity can provide partial insurance against 
liquidity shocks. Banks may be able to provide depositors with additional insurance by 
subsidizing consumers that unexpectedly experience high liquidity needs (Bryant, 1980; 
Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). However, if banks coexist with financial markets where claims on 
the bank can be traded, such subsidization gives rise to arbitrage opportunities. The existence of 
arbitrage rules out cross-subsidization between consumers with high and low liquidity needs 
(Jacklin, 1987).
6 Thus it seems that markets may undermine banks’ ability to provide liquidity 
insurance.  
A theory of financial intermediation as liquidity pools can also be based on firms’ liquidity 
needs instead of consumer liquidity needs (Holmström and Tirole, 1998). When firms face 
idiosyncratic shocks and hold claims on other firms as insurance against such shocks, lucky 
firms will end up holding excess liquidity. However, they cannot redistribute these claims to 
unlucky firms because borrowers are subject to moral hazard. Intermediaries may act as insurers 
and redistribute excess liquidity. 
 
5 Boyd and Prescott (1986) present an alternative formulation, using cooperative game theory. In their model, agents have a 
good or a bad project. An agent knows the quality of his own project and can – at a cost - produce a noisy signal of this 
quality. Outside investors can only observe the noisy signal. Because the signal is noisy, an agent with a bad project can 
evaluate the project and hope it will succeed. Therefore, in the absence of coalition forming some agents with bad projects 
will produce a costly signal. However, when agents form a coalition the coalition can induce bad and good agents to 
truthfully reveal the quality of their project to the coalition. The coalition then only produces signals on the good projects. 
Thus, coalition forming provides bad agents an incentive to truthfully reveal their information. Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) 
argue that intermediation can create adverse-selection-free demand deposits. 
6 Diamond (1997) argues that if a sufficiently large group of consumers has no access to financial markets, banks are still 
able to improve the allocation of risk by cross-subsidization.   25 
Interestingly, if consumers’ and firms’ liquidity needs are uncorrelated these two views can be 
combined. Pooling the liquidity needs of both consumers and firms creates additional benefits 
from diversification (Kashyap et. al 2002). This provides a rationale for the stylized fact that 
banks combine illiquid debt on the asset side of their balance sheet with demand deposits on the 
liability side of their balance sheet. 
2.1.2  Relationship banking 
A complementary strand of literature claims that banks add value by facilitating long-term 
relationships between lenders and borrowers. Long-term relationships may be valuable for 
several reasons.
7 
First, aggregating signals over multiple periods may reduce uncertainty about behaviour. If 
firms choose each period between behaving or shirking, preventing shirking becomes easier the 
more periods a contract can be conditioned upon (Haubrich, 1989).  
Second, repeated interaction generally increases the number of outcomes feasible in 
equilibrium. In the context of bank-borrower relationships, this is also true. If contracts are 
incomplete, long-term relations may have advantages over short-term relations. The loss of 
reputation or future revenue functions as a stick that enforces mutually profitable contracts.  
For example, banks may face adverse shocks on which they cannot make their contracts 
with borrowers contingent. If such a noncontractible shock occurs and pushes a bank towards 
bankruptcy, it may want to be able to renege on its contractual obligations. If contracts allow a 
bank to renege on its obligations, however, it may want to renege also in the absence of a shock 
once a contract has been signed. Borrowers may therefore fear ex post opportunism. Long-term 
relationships can prevent such opportunistic behaviour by the bank (Boot et al., 1993). 
Long-term contracts may also allow efficient intertemporal subsidization. Suppose that 
banks initially face an adverse selection problem, but learn the quality of their borrower over 
time once they have contracted. If banks have market power, they can charge lower initial 
interest rates (Petersen and Rajan, 1995). 
But long-term relations are not only beneficial, they may also have costs. Lock-in between a 
bank and its borrower opens up the possibility of ex post expropriation for the bank and ex post 
renegotiation for the borrower. It also exposes borrowers to the risks faced by banks.  
First, if a borrower encounters a new, profitable investment during its relationship with the 
bank, or new information on the profitability of existing investments arrives, the bank can fully 
appropriate these additional profits if it has sufficient bargaining power. A bank will have such 
bargaining power if it has more information than outside banks due to its long-term relationship 
with the borrower. Thus, borrowers may be held-up by the prospect of expropriation and 
underinvestment results because a bank may try to expropriate a locked-in borrower when new 
investment opportunities arise.  
 
7 Some valuable information may be hard to contract upon, because courts do not allow it, or because contracts become too 
complex. See Tirole (1999) for a discussion on the foundations of incomplete contracting.   26 
Second, if a borrower gets into trouble, the bank may want to bail him out ex post, even though 
it would not want to do so ex ante. Banks may be subject to a soft-budget constraint. Once a 
bank and its customer become locked-in, it may be optimal for the bank to treat its customer 
leniently when problems arise. Because the borrower knows ex ante that he will get bailed out if 
in trouble, he will put in less effort to prevent bad outcomes ( Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992). 
Finally, if borrowers are locked in to do business with one particular bank, they are also 
exposed to the risk that this bank will face bankruptcy. If this risk is sufficiently large, 
borrowers may not want to put all their eggs in one basket (Detragiache et al., 2000). Multiple 
relationships can reduce the potential for ex post expropriation and the dependency on one 
particular bank, although the inherent free riding also undermines incentives to monitor ((Jean-
Baptiste, 2001; Carletti, 2004). 
2.1.3  Economies of scope 
Financial conglomerates offer a range of services to their clients in addition to the traditional 
services of holding deposits and extending loans. These include selling insurance, underwriting 
securities, and carrying out transactions on behalf of their clients. Other financial intermediaries 
specialize in offering one of these services. Conglomerate may have a competitive advantage 
over specialized firms because of economies of scope. If economies of scope are indeed 
important, we may see a continuing trend towards large, universal banks.
8 However, if 
economies of scope are limited, we might instead see a move away from large, universal banks 
and towards smaller, more specialized banks. 
What are potential sources of economies of scope? In the process of making loans, banks 
acquire information about clients that may allow them to provide other financial services to 
these clients more efficiently (Rajan, 1992). For example, contact between a loan officer and a 
firm may offer opportunities to assess additional needs, such as credit facilities, securities 
underwriting or insurance needs. Similarly, brokerage, securities trading and securities 
underwriting may provide information that allows banks to provide loans more efficiently. 
On the other hand, greater diversity of activities may also result in diseconomies of scope 
because it intensifies agency problems. For example, Stein (2002) argues that small 
organisations are better than complex, hierarchical organisations at handling soft information, 
which cannot be transmitted. Centralised decision-making blunts managers’ research incentives 
because they face the risk that his superiors will cut his budget because of better investment 
opportunities in other business units. Kanatas and Qi (2003) present a model where economies 
of scope results in market power for conglomerates. However, this reduces their incentives to 
invest in costly underwriting efforts. Therefore, financial conglomerates are less successful in 
selling their clients' securities. 
In the end, to what extent economies of scope exist, is an empirical question. The empirical 
evidence, however, is mixed at best. In reviewing the empirical literature on scope economies, 
 
8 This may also depend on another strategic benefits of being large: the value of being too-complex-to-fail.   27 
Mester (2008) concludes: ‘Most studies have not found strong evidence of scope economies, 
either between traditional commercial banking products, or between on-balance-sheet and off-
balance-sheet bank products.’ Berger and Humphrey (1997) argue that this is due to 
econometric difficulties in identifying cost function for financial conglomerates. 
Leaven and Levine (2007) find a diversification discount for financial conglomerates 
relative to financial intermediaries that specialize in individual activities. They suggest this is 
due to increased agency costs. Drucker and Puri (2005), find that if a financial intermediary 
provides both loans and underwriting services to a firm, this will increase the probability of 
receiving current and future business. To attract firms, it will charge lower fees. On the other 
hand, combining these activities also creates a potential conflict of interest, because a financial 
intermediary may be tempted to inflate the price of the initial public offering (Krozner and 
Rajan, 1994; Puri, 1996; Schenone, 2004).  
2.2  Market failures 
The essence of government regulation of financial markets lies in the high costs for society that 
bank distress, either collectively or individually, may inflict. If the failure of banks would not be 
harmful to society, there would be no need for the extensive government intervention so 
familiar in the financial sector. The previous section argues that banks resolve information 
asymmetry. In this way, banks allow for a more efficient allocation of funds, which generates 
additional economic growth. If banks for some reason collectively get into problems, they can 
no longer play their role in easing these constraints by resolving information asymmetry.
9  
Indeed, empirical evidence shows that financial crises are typically very costly. Cerra and 
Saxena (2008) estimate that the loss due to a crisis varies from 4 to 16 percent of GDP, and 
Hoggarth, Reis, and Saporta (2002) find that the cumulative output losses incurred during crisis 
periods are roughly 15–20 percent of GDP. Claessens et. al (2008) find that recessions 
associated with credit crunches and house price busts tend to be deeper and longer than other 
recessions. The median cumulative loss in GDP of 13 recessions associated with both a credit 
crunch and a house price bust is 6.7 percent. Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) compare data from the 
18 bank-centered financial crises with the 2007 US sub-prime crisis. For the five most 
catastrophic cases (which include episodes in Finland, Japan, Norway, Spain, and Sweden), the 
drop in annual output growth from peak to trough is over 5 percent, and growth remained well 
below pre-crisis trend even after three years.
10 
 
9 In the words of Mishkin (1999) “financial instability occurs when shocks to the financial system interfere with information 
flows so that the financial system can no longer do its job of channelling funds to those with productive investment 
opportunities.” A banking crisis negatively affects economic growth because some firms no longer have access to bank 
financing. The full cost of inefficient financial markets then becomes apparent. 
10 However, this is not necessarily evidence that banking problems contribute to the decline in output: the same exogenous 
adverse shocks that trigger banking problems may also cause a decline in aggregate demand, leading firms to cut 
investment and working capital and, ultimately, demand for bank credit. Dell’ariccia, Detragiache and Rajan (2008) provide   28 
Another justification for government intervention that central bankers and policymakers 
often mention is safeguarding the integrity of the payment system. If a particular bank 
incorporates part of a market infrastructure, like payment- or settlement systems, such 
infrastructure may temporarily break down when a bank goes bankrupt. It is often somewhat 
unclear what is meant by ‘the payment system’. It may refer to the potential for consumers to 
withdraw money from their bank accounts by using other banks’ ATMs or the possibility to pay 
electronically when they purchase goods. Alternatively, it may refer to the interbank payment 
system, such as the large-value payment system TARGET2.
11 Preventing a breakdown of such 
market infrastructure is important because it may lead to contagion. 
So far, we argued that banking distress is costly. But if car manufacturers or bakeries 
collectively run into troubles, this is also costly for society.
12 In what sense do banks differ from 
car manufacturers or bakeries? What are the market failures that differentiate banks from non 
financial firms? Banks have an incentive to take on too much risk because they do not take the 
external effects of their risk taking into account. These external effects arises because of two 
reasons. First, bank’s and shareholders limited liability creates an incentive to shift risk to 
small, uninformed depositors who are unable to monitor and intervene to discipline banks. 
Here, banks and car manufactures differ because the latter usually have a few large creditors. 
Second, one bank’s risk taking decisions have negative external effects for other banks because 
contagion can cause problems to spill-over to other banks. In contrast, the failure of a car 
manufacturer has no such negative consequences for its competitors. 
2.2.1  Failing corporate governance 
As we have seen, banks can solve free riding in monitoring by acting as a delegated monitor. 
However, banks themselves are not exempt from moral hazard. The question then becomes: 
who monitors the monitor? The complexity of financial products and ability of banks to quickly 
change their risk profile makes banks’ balance sheets more opaque and more fluid than that of 
other firms. The risk profile of a bank’s portfolio of loans and investments can change quickly 
as a result of a few transactions. It is therefore difficult for outsiders to accurately assess a 
bank’s risks. Empirically, Morgan (2002) and Ianotta (2006) show that credit rating agencies 
more often have differing opinions on the creditworthiness of banks than that of non financial 
firms. Banks are inherently more opaque than other types of firms. The greater intransparancy 
increases the scope for moral hazard.  
In addition, banks, like all firms, are subject to limited liability. Limited liability implies that 
banks are not liable for any remaining losses if they go bankrupt. As a consequence, the upside 
                                                                                                                                                          
evidence that industries that are more dependent on external finance are hurt more severely after a banking crisis, 
suggesting that banking problems are the driving force. 
11 This payment system is accessible to commercial banks, central banks, clearing houses, government agencies and some 
non-commercial organizations like the IMF. 
12 Although some may argue that a collective failure of banks is more costly than a collective failure of bakeries.   29 
of the risk they take is unbounded, but the downside is limited. If banks make a huge profit on 
risky investments, they are the beneficiary of this gain. But if the investment turns into a 
catastrophic loss, someone else, e.g., the bank’s creditors and, ultimately, the taxpayer, will 
have to bear the burden. The combination of moral hazard and limited liability therefore makes 
banks risk loving.
13 As a result banks take more risk than its financiers, the bank’s creditors and 
its stockholders, desire. 
In principle, an appropriate corporate governance structure, i.e., monitoring by debtholders 
and the threat of intervention, can address this problem. As Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) 
show, interests can be aligned if corporate governance succeeds in creating a carrot and a 
sufficiently harsh stick. Promising equity holders and debtholders different cash flows provides 
them with incentives to credibly punish a firm if it is performing badly. This punishment comes 
in the form of strict intervention by a firm’s debtholders. Optimal corporate governance shifts 
control from relatively passive claimholders (shareholders) when performance is good to more 
interventionist claimholders (debt holders) when performance is bad. The covenants of debt 
contracts specify the condition under which debtholders can partly take over control over a firm 
in order to safeguard their interests. Of course, debt holders also need to monitor the bank. 
Because each debtholder wants to benefit from other debtholders’ monitoring efforts, 
monitoring is subject to free-rider behaviour. Banks solve this free riding problem by acting as 
delegated monitors. 
Unfortunately, this solution does not work for banks. An important difference between 
ordinary firms and banks is that ordinary firms’ debt is often held by large investors such as 
banks, whereas bank debt is held mainly by small and dispersed depositors. Bank depositors 
face unusually severe governance problems because, due to their large numbers, they suffer 
from free-rider effects and lack information about opaque and fluid bank assets. This limits 
their ability to discipline banks and curb excessive risk taking. Because depositors are unable to 
properly monitor banks and exercise their control rights, prudential regulation is needed to 





13 Without limited liability, a bank’s financier could costlessly eliminate moral hazard. Intuitively, making the bank residual 
claimant would then resolve the conflict of interest between the bank and its financiers. 
14 The literature provides several alternatives to regulation as a way to ensure the bank has proper incentives to monitor. 
First, diversification may reduce the agency cost of monitoring the monitor, because it reduces the uncertainty about 
outcome. Indeed, in the limit of perfect diversification, banks face no uncertainty about the payoff of their investments. Of 
course, in the absence of uncertainty, the agency costs of solving the moral hazard problem are zero (Diamond, 1984). 
Second, banks will have an incentive to monitor if they co-invest some of their own capital with the loans they extend to 
borrowers. A bank’s own stake in a loan reduces its incentive to shirk (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). Third, fragile demand 
deposits create an incentive for banks to monitor depositors. If failing management triggers bank runs, a banker will face a 
bank run if he does not behave (Calomiris and Kahn, 1991; Flannery, 1994; Diamond and Rajan, 2001). The latter theories 
also provide a rationale for the fact that banks fund the long-term, illiquid, loans on the asset side of their balance sheet by 
issuing short-term debt on the liability side of their balance sheet, such as demand deposits or overnight-unsecured debt.    30 
Because bank’s moral hazard is so difficult to contain, long-term investors in banks face much 
larger agency costs than long-term investors in non financial firms. Some argue that banks 
finance themselves largely with short-term demandable debt to solve this problem. Such debt 
serves two purposes (Calomiris en Kahn, 1991; Flannery, 1994). First, it solves the free-rider 
problem. The holders of short-term debt have an incentive to monitor: if they are the first to 
identify potential problems, they will be first in line to withdraw their debt. If debtholders do 
not monitor, chances are they will lose their money. Second, it disciplines the bank’s 
management because they will face bankruptcy if they mismanage the bank.  
As a result, banks’ balance sheets consist of liabilities in the form of short-term demandable 
debt, for example deposits that can be withdrawn at any time, and assets in the form of long-
term loans. This mismatch in the maturity of bank’s asset and liabilities creates the potential for 
bank runs (Bryant, 1980; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). In the models of Bryant (1980) and 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), bank runs are random ‘sunspot’ events. An alternative view of 
bank run is that they are not random, but triggered by information that indicates that the return 
on bank assets may be unusually low. Calomiris and Gorton (1991) present evidence that bank 
runs are related to the business cycle instead of a random event. 
2.2.2  Loss of sunk investment 
This market failure plays a minor role in the rest of this document, but we discuss it briefly for 
the sake of completeness. The failure of a bank (as opposed to the failure of multiple banks 
resulting in a banking crisis) may be costly to society because it inflicts negative externalities 
on bank customers. When a bank runs into trouble, some of the investment projects financed by 
the bank may have to be liquidated. The liquidation value of a loan is lower that its continuation 
value if some of this value is bank-specific. This may, for example, happen if a bank develops 
relationship-specific abilities to restrain its borrowers’ moral hazard. Also, if banks have 
private, non-verifiable information about the creditworthiness of their borrowers, these 
borrowers may no longer be able to acquire funding for profitable investments if their bank has 
collapsed.  
Note, however, that such negative effects on customers also exist for non financial firms if 
there are large relationship-specific investments. Nevertheless, it may be the case that the 
relationship-specific value of a bank and its customers is larger than that of non financial firms 
and their customers.  
2.2.3  Interbank externalities 
The potential for one bank’s problems to infect other banks is a second important difference 
between banking and other economic activities such as car manufacturing. In most markets, a 
firm will benefit from its competitor’s problems, because one firm’s bankruptcy will most likely 
result in increased demand for its competitors. In the case of banks, however, one bank’s 
problems, such as a bankruptcy or less extreme circumstances such as large losses may spread   31 
to other banks and affect the banking system as a whole. Contagion refers to the mechanism by 
which shocks experienced by one bank or a group of banks propagate to other banks or feed 
back into banks to reinforce the shock. 
Interbank externalities exist if banks do not take into account the effect of contagion when 
deciding on their contracts with other banks, the level of risk on their balance sheet, or their 
effort to recapitalize when hit by an idiosyncratic shock. The question now becomes what 
mechanisms give rise to these externalities? The literature identifies a number of potential 
mechanisms for shocks experienced by one bank to propagate to other banks, which can be 
roughly grouped into three classes. 
First, the problems faced by bank A may lead to a loss for bank B because some of its assets 
drop in value. Such a negative effect on bank B’s asset prices may occur directly or indirectly. 
Direct effects arise due to bilateral contracts or exposure (Freixas et al., 2000; Allen and Gale, 
2000; Dasgupta, 2004). Direct contractual relations between banks exist in the form of 
interbank loans, credit lines, or insurance contracts bank have extended to each other. When for 
some reason banks default on these contracts, other banks suffer losses. As bank A becomes 
more likely to default on its payments, the value of such contracts decreases. Thus, some of the 
costs of increased risk taking by a bank are borne by competitors with whom the bank has direct 
contractual relations. Indirect effects arise due to exposure to mutual borrowers or creditors 
(Kyle and Xiong, 2001; Goldstein and Pauzner, 2004). Whereas under normal circumstances 
information about direct trading partners is enough to avoid large default risk, under stress more 
information is needed to secure the same level of counterparty risk. Due to the complex network 
of interconnections, this may become prohibitively expensive, reducing liquidity (Caballero and 
Simsek 2009). 
Note, however, that even though problems may propagate from one bank to another through 
these interconnections, this does not immediately imply the existence of externalities. For 
example, assume that links between banks arise because of bilateral contracts that insure banks 
against liquidity shocks. The links between banks then arise endogenously. Because banks price 
the risk of a liquidity shock, what may look like an externality ex post can simply be a correctly 
priced exposure to risk ex ante. For example, Allen and Gale (2000) argue that a complete 
network where all parties involved are connected to all others is more robust than the 
incomplete networks. 
Second, even if bank B’s assets are unaffected, the problems faced by bank A may 
negatively affect bank B’s ability to fund itself. Bank A’s problems may cause conditions for 
recapitalisation or refinancing of bank B’s short-term debt to tighten. Externalities then arise 
because a bank doesn’t take into account the effects on other banks of its decision to sell assets 
or to withhold liquidity from the market. This can happen in several ways. First, one banks 
decision to sell asset may lower the value of other banks’ assets because of fire sales. Fire sales 
arise when increased supply of assets lowers the market value of these assets. This negatively 
affects other banks’ ability to withstand shocks by selling assets themselves. Second, adverse   32 
selection due to asymmetric information may lead to a breakdown of the market. If lenders in 
the interbank markets do not know whether borrowers need cash because they experienced a 
liquidity shock, or because their assets turned out to be of bad quality, the ensuing lemons 
problem may cause the market to freeze (Heider, Hoerova and Holthausen, 2009). A final 
explanation for drying-up of liquidity may be liquidity hoarding. Banks with sufficient cash 
may strategically under-provide lending, thereby inducing inefficient sales of bank-specific 
assets. (Acharya, Gromb and Yorulmazer, 2008).  
Third, shocks can also spread from bank to bank through informational spillovers. For 
example, bank runs can spread because a run on one bank implies information about other 
banks that allows rational agents to update their beliefs. More generally, one bank’s problems 
may generate adverse information about other banks. This can be information about the 
intensity with which central banks or creditors monitor banks’ management, the value of banks’ 
assets
15, or an event that reveals the existence of an aggregate liquidity shortage. 
2.3  Government failures 
Government policy does not always improve social welfare. Economists often use the term 
government failure to refer to such a situation. Although no generally accepted definition of 
government failure exists, according to Winston (2006, pp. 2-3), government failure arises 
when government intervention, such as regulation or subsidization, introduces a new 
inefficiency “because it should not have intervened in the first place or when it could have 
solved a given problem [...] more efficiently, that is, by generating greater net benefits”. He 
goes on to argue that government failures “appear to be explained by the inflexibility, and 
conflicting policies of government agencies; and by political forces that allow well-defined 
interest groups to influence elected and unelected officials to initiate and maintain inefficient 
policies that enable the interest groups to accrue economic rents.” 
2.3.1  Capture 
The public interest theory of government intervention characterizes regulatory agencies as 
benevolent maximizers of social welfare, possibly subject to informational asymmetry. The 
private-interest theory of regulation, on the other hand, claims that the regulatory process can be 
captured by well-organized interest groups (Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976). Interest groups can 
try to capture government decision making by providing biased information, offering monetary 
bribes, providing future employment opportunities, entering into personal relationships with 
decision makers, offering the prospect of an easy life for the regulator, and contributions to 
political campaigns.  
Financial institutions’ interests are at stake in the formulation and implementation of 
regulation. Government intervention in the financial sector regulation is not immune to capture. 
 
15 If correlations in underlying value across banks exist.   33 
Laffont (1999) argues that the ease of regulatory capture depends on ‘the variability of the 
environment, the extent of asymmetric information about tastes or technologies and the size of 
the majorities.’ 
Some features of financial markets increase the susceptibility of its regulators to capture. 
First, in many countries the financial sector comprises several very large institutions. These are 
often well connected to the political establishment and organized into powerful banking 
associations. These engage in lobbying efforts and participate in the public debate on regulatory 
measures. Typically, regulators initiate a consultation process when they introducing or change 
regulation. Sometimes regulators have an explicit mandate to further the interests of the 
financial sector from an international perspective. In contrast, other stakeholders, such as 
deposit holders, are less well organised. Second, the nature of banking supervision requires 
regular and close contact between bankers and regulators. This presents bankers with numerous 
opportunities to present their views. Third, banks are better informed than supervisors, who 
depend on the banks for their information. For effective supervision, regulators therefore need 
banks’ cooperation. They need access to documentation and data and up to date information on 
new products and operations. Finally, staff regularly migrates between regulated institutions 
and the regulator. Those with intimate knowledge of the functioning of supervisory agencies 
can earn high salaries in the industry. This may soften regulators handling of banks and may 
result in forbearance. 
Although empirical evidence on regulatory capture in finance is scarce, some empirical 
papers illustrate how restrictions on banking activities can be abused for rent seeking activities. 
Kroszner and Strahan (1999) find that deregulation in the US occurs earlier in states with fewer 
small banks, in states where small banks are financially weaker, and in states with more small, 
presumably bank-dependent, firms. Also, a larger insurance industry delays deregulation when 
banks may compete in the sale of insurance products. Interest group factors related to the 
relative strength of potential winners (large banks and small firms) and losers (small banks and 
the rival insurance firms) can thus explain the timing of branching deregulation across states. 
Kwahja and Mian (2005) find that in Pakistan politically-connected firms obtain exclusive loans 
from public banks and have much higher default rates. In the context of the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis, Igan et al. (2009) find that financial institutions lobbying on specific issues related to 
mortgage lending and securitisation adopted significantly riskier mortgage lending strategies in 
the run-up to the crisis. 
2.3.2  Commitment 
In regulating banks, governments face a classic trade-off. To discipline banks ex ante, 
governments should be as tough as possible. Banks that expect not to be saved if they take too 
much risk will behave more prudently. However, when a crisis arises, being tough on banks 
may not be the best course of action. Ex post, the failure of a large, highly interconnected 
financial firm can destabilize the financial system and the broader economy. The failure of a   34 
large financial institution directly harms its counterparties in the financial system, can induce 
liquidity freezes, and can negatively affect expectations about other financial institutions. As a 
result, regulators may postpone intervention (i.e., engage in forbearance). In addition, 
governments are very reluctant to let large, interconnected banks fail or impose substantial costs 
on the bank’s creditors. 
To prevent bank failures, governments provide banks and their creditors with explicit 
guarantees. Explicit guarantees take the form of deposit insurance and the central bank’s lender 
of last resort role. Banks that are perceived as too big to fail or too interconnected to fail, 
however, also receive the benefit of implicit guarantees. No matter what, the government will 
save these banks by extending guarantees or full-blown bailouts. 
The expectation that a financial firm or its creditors will be saved because it is too-big-to-
fail or too-interconnected-to-fail, however, has undesirable effects. It reduces market discipline 
and encourages excessive risk-taking by the firm. When a bank’s creditors are fully protected, 
they have little incentive to monitor its activities and charge higher interest rates or withdraw 
their funds if a bank is taking on too much risk. In the absence of such discipline, banks can 
costlessly engage in risky activities. It also provides an incentive for firms to grow and creates 
an uneven playing field with firms that do not have such implicit government support.  
Governments therefore face a trade-off between ex ante discipline and ex post efficiency. If 
the government cannot commit itself to a particular course of action, this will result in too little 
ex ante discipline and too much ex post efficiency. Governments will then save too many banks 
and impose too little ex ante discipline. 
2.3.3  Coordination 
When financial stability creates international spillovers, all measures that promote financial 
stability, such as burden sharing agreements or tougher regulation, will be subject to free rider 
behaviour. As a result, individual countries will generally invest too little to increase financial 
stability. For example, when discussing burden sharing mechanisms, Schoenmaker and 
Goodhart (2009) state: “burden-sharing arrangements are subject to the free-rider problem. 
Countries that do not sign up for burden sharing profit from burden sharing, as the stability of 
the European financial system is a public good.” 
International spillovers can arise in several ways. First, through cross-border banks are 
active in multiple countries. Such cross-border activities create the potential for spillovers from 
one country to another. If banking supervision in one country is less strict than in another 
country, the more prudent country bears part of the risk created by soft supervision. Second, 
even if banks are not active in multiple countries, contagion can also lead to spillovers from one 
country to another. If banks are interconnected, for example through direct credit lines or a 
common interbank market, losses in one country will affect banks in other countries. Because of 
such spillovers, individual countries will do too little to reduce systemic risk and one 
government’s decision not to bail out a particular financial intermediary may have international   35 
consequences. Finally, one country’s intervention in times of crisis can have repercussions for 
other countries as well. For example, when governments extend guarantees to banks they often 
favour national institutions and have a bias towards local lending, putting foreign banks at a 
competitive disadvantage.  
A small literature explores the consequences of this lack of coordination in financial 
regulation. Acharya (2003), for example, shows that competition in capital standards may result 
in a race-to-bottom. Regulators will try to improve the competitive position of domestic banks. 
Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) study competition among regulators. They show that such 
competition reduces regulatory standards compared to a centralised setting. Freixas (2003) 
investigates the efficiency of lender of last resort facilities in a multi-country setting. 
Underprovision of resources results because small countries want to free ride on the efforts 
made by larger countries. 
Currently, there exists no framework for regulating, supervising and restructuring large 
cross-border financial institutions. And no international cross-country burden sharing 
arrangements to coordinate intervention in times of crisis. Also, there exist no global 
institutions that are able to reduce free rider effects and force countries to internalise the effect 
of their soft regulation on other countries. 
This should not come as a surprise, because building such a framework requires 
coordination between countries that may have diverging interests, are able to free ride on other 
countries efforts, or actively compete to be attractive to profitable industries. We are not aware 
of theoretical or empirical research that explores how effective international coordination on 
financial markets regulation is, or how the incentive to coordinate internationally can be 
improved. Anecdotal evidence, however, is in abundance. For example, according to the 
Financial Times the intention of European Commission to regulate “the hedge fund and private 
equity industries could cause a transatlantic rift by discriminating against US groups.” It goes 
on by saying that “A letter sent by Mr Geithner this month to Michel Barnier, Europe’s internal 
market commissioner, makes it clear that the European Union is heading for a clash with 
Washington if it pushes ahead with what the US – and Britain– fear could be a protectionist 
law.”
16 Views on how to regulate may also differ. When Barack Obama’s launched his plan to 
limit deposit-taking banks from proprietary trading, the UK business secretary Lord Mandelson 
said “Trying to apply sweeping rules about the structure, content and range of activities of 
banking entities is too difficult to do”.
17 
 
16 Financial Times, Geithner warns of rift over regulation, 10 March 2010. 
17 Financial Times, Mandelson knocks ‘Volcker rule’ as too difficult, March 3 2010.   36   37 
3  Pre crisis developments  
Financial systems around the world have changed profoundly over the past decades. These 
changes are driven by three factors: developments in ICT, government policy in the form of 
deregulation and subsidies, and an increasing demand for liquid stores of value due to 
globalisation (see also Mishkin and Strahan, 1999; Rajan, 2005; Boot and Thakor, 2008; Bikker 
and Bos, 2008). 
The first key driver of the pre-crisis developments in the banking sector is technological 
progress and more specifically the advances in information and communications technology. 
The lasts five decades, the computational power of computers has developed according to what 
is referred to as Moore’s law: the number of transistors on integrated circuits roughly doubles 
every two years. The performance of computers per unit cost thus increases at the same rate. 
The same type of exponential growth applies to storage capacity and network capacity.
18 
Information technology and telecommunications are an important part of banks’ production 
technologies. Indeed, in the U.S., financial institutions are the most IT-intensive industry as 
measured by the ratio of computer equipment and software to value-added (10,9%, see table 2 
in Triplett and Bosworth, 2002). The same applies to the finance industry in the Netherlands if 
measured by ICT capital as a percentage of total capital (5.6% in 1995, Van der Wiel, 2001). As 
software adapted, and the Internet developed, the costs of individual transactions and the costs 
of acquiring information decreased.
19 This led to the emergence of credit scoring models, 
internet banking, electronic payment systems, and electronic trading platforms. Although the 
impact of technological progress on banks is difficult to measure, Berger (2003) concludes that 
scale economies appear to have risen, that multi-bank holding companies improved control over 
their affiliate banks, and that banks have been able to make small business loans at greater 
distances. 
The second important factor is government policy. Governments liberalised and deregulated 
financial markets, introduced and strengthened deposit guarantees schemes, and stimulated 
house ownership among low-income households. Liberalisation and deregulation levelled the 
international playing field. It enabled banks to offer a wider range of services and stimulated 
international expansion. Changes in regulation allowed banks to hold less equity. And subsidies 
for house ownership increased indebtedness and fuelled the securitisation of mortgages. 
Deregulation took place both in the US and in Europe. In the US, deposit rate ceilings were 
removed, restrictions on interstate branching were lifted, and limitations on banking activities 
abolished.  
Until the 1980s, most US states prohibited cross-state bank holdings and limited branching 
within a state. Because states received fees for granting a bank charter, owned banks, or levied 
 
18 Of course, the laws of physics imply that exponential growth cannot continue indefinitely. 
19 The BIS triennial survey showed that 20-30% of interbank trading in the major currencies was conducted using electronic 
brokers in 1995 and this rose to about 50% in 1998 and it is now likely to exceed 90% in 2001 (BIS, 2001).   38 
taxes on them, they had an incentive to reduce competition to increase their revenues. 
Technological developments such as the automated teller machine (ATM) in the early 1970s, 
however, lowered the value of geographic protections to local banks (Krozner and Strahan, 
2007). Between 1970 and 1998, 38 states deregulated their restrictions on branching. The 
Riegle-Neal Interstate banking and branching Efficiency Act of 1994 finally removed interstate 
banking restrictions and permitted banks to enter another state without permission. The US 
Federal Reserve also imposed ceilings on banks’ interest rates through regulation-Q. In the 
1970s market interest rates rose due to economic circumstances, which reduced banks’ deposit 
supplies and forced them to cut back lending. To allow banks to compete with non-regulated 
financial intermediaries such as money market mutual funds, US congress passed the 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act in 1980, which lowered reserve 
requirements and gradually phased out deposit rate ceilings. Finally, the restrictions imposed by 
the Glass-Steagall Act from 1933 were gradually eased during the late 1980s and in the 1990s, 
until the Financial Modernization or Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 removed the remaining 
limitations. 
In Europe, the creation of a single market and the introduction of the euro removed national 
boundaries and fostered the integration of capital markets. In addition, banking regulation was 
partly harmonised. An important step in the process of integration of the EU financial market 
was the Second Banking Co-ordination Directive that came into force in January 1993. This 
directive introduced the so-called single bank license, which allowed banks to freely branch out 
in other EU countries. A bank’s home country supervisors became responsible for the 
supervision of operations in other countries. The introduction of the euro created markets with 
deeper liquidity that served as a cradle for innovations. The high-yield bond market took an 
enormous flight, because the liquidity risk of high yield bonds reduced dramatically (De Bondt 
and Marques Ibanez, 2004), in particular in the segment of low rated (A rated or lower) 
corporate bonds (p.55, ECB, 2007).  
On a global level, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision initiated a coordinated 
attempt at reforming the capital adequacy framework. In 1988, Basel I was introduced, setting 
international standards for banks’ capital requirements. Basel II, finalised in 1999, was designed 
to create a more risk sensitive capital adequacy framework, by providing more granularity in 
the measurement of credit risk, correcting for differences in risk management across banks, and 
taking into account other risks such as operational risk.
20 Although Basel II was seen by many 
as a step forward, as a consequence of the new rules especially large banks were able to reduce 
their regulatory capital. Blundel-Wignall and Atkinson (2008) estimate that the transition to 
Basel II’s achieved a reduction of $220 billion in regulatory capital for American commercial 
banks. It also made regulation even more dependent on the risk assessments by credit rating 
agencies. 
 
20 Credit risk is the risk of loss due to a debtor's non-payment of a loan or other line of credit (either the principal or interest 
(coupon) or both). Operational risks are risks arising from execution of a bank's business functions.   39 
A third factor that had a great impact on the development of the financial sector are the 
global imbalances that contributed to the increasing demand for liquid stores of value. The U.S. 
current account deficit started to deteriorate in 1991 and reached 6.4% of U.S. GDP in the 
fourth quarter of 2005. The mirror image of these deficits were the large surpluses in Japan, 
Europe emerging Asia and countries such as Norway, Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. These resulted 
in a large demand for liquid stores of value in some regions of the world, and the potential to 
supply such stores of value in other regions of the world (Caballero, Fahri, Gourinchas, 2008). 
Securitisation allowed banks to bring supply and demand together. 
These drivers have led to a number of developments that lie at the hart of the 2007-2008 
financial crisis. First and foremost, the commoditisation of credit risk. Second, the rise of longer 
intermediation chains and market-based financial intermediation. Third, increased leverage and 
short-term funding. Fourth, the emergence of new financial intermediaries. Fifth, increased 
interconnectedness between financial intermediaries. Sixth, the growing importance of 
performance pay. And finally, consolidation and conglomeration. We discuss these 
developments in more detail below. 
3.1  Commoditisation of credit risk 
A first important development is the commoditisation of credit risk, as exemplified by the rise 
of securitisation and the growing market for credit default swaps. Securitisation of loans and 
mortgages implies that a bank sells these assets to a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), that fund 
itself by issuing several tranches of asset backed securities (ABS) with differing seniority. In 
this way, credit risk is first pooled and then redefined in tradable securities. Usually, the bank 
retains the tranches with the highest risk, to guarantee that it has incentives to monitor the 
underlying assets.
21 A credit default swaps (CDS) is an agreement between a protection buyer 
and a protection seller, whereby the buyer pays a periodic fee in return for a payment by the 
seller contingent on a credit event, such as bankruptcy or restructuring of debt. Figure 3.1 shows 
the growth of securitisation and the credit default swaps market. This growth originated from an 
increased demand for liquid stores of value as well as the ability of banks to supply these 
products, which resulted from, technological progress and regulation. 
The demand for liquid stores of value resulted from an ageing population in the west and 
rapidly growing economies in China and East Asia. The export led growth strategies in 
emerging countries created large surpluses that needed to be stored. The need to save now to be 
able to spend later created a huge demand for liquid ‘stores of value’, i.e., easily tradable claims 
on future cash flows. Securitised loans provide such liquid stores of value. In addition, 
regulation stimulated the demand for triple-A rated products by requiring pension funds to hold 
 
21 In synthetic securitisations, the transfer of a portfolio of loans is mimicked using credit derivatives such as credit default 
swaps (CDS), total returns swaps of credit-linked notes. Thus, assets stay on the bank’s balance sheet. Basel II consists of 
three pillars: risk-adjusted minimum capital requirements (Pillar I), Basel II a supervisory review process (Pillar II), and 
disclosure requirements to enhance market discipline (Pillar III).    40 
certain amounts of their assets in such products, and by allowing banks to hold lower capital 
reserves against triple-A rated assets.  
On the supply side, ICT development made securitisation an off-the-shelf technology, which 
could be routinely applied to bundles of loans. The new technology allowed financial 
intermediaries to store and analyse the credit histories of large numbers of individuals and 
companies. Credit scoring models rely on the statistical analysis of default risk and require large 
databases on default histories. To build a good model, developers need sufficient historical data, 
which reflect loan performance in periods of both good and bad economic conditions. 
Information technology allowed these techniques to develop in the 1990s. For example, 
BankAmerica used about 30.000 small business loans to develop a credit-scoring model to 
evaluate small-business loan applications (Mester, 1997). Also for high risk mortgage loans 
such models were developed, but given their short history, these were not tested through an 
economic cycle.  
Regulation also contributed, because it allowed banks to use this financial innovation to 
satisfy demand. In the US, several policy measures contributed to the rise of securitisation and 
the increasing importance of credit default swaps (Levine, 2010). The Federal Reserve decided 
in 1996 that banks could reduce their capital cushions using credit default swaps (CDS). 
Regulators treated CDSs as having the risk level of the counterparty to the swap. As a result, 
counterparties such as AIG, with a triple-A rating amassed large exposures to credit risk. 
Finally, in the mid-1990s, regulators started to use quantitative guidelines to stimulate lending 
by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae to low-and moderate-income areas and borrowers.
22 
All this created the conditions under which loans could be bundled together, split up in 
different securities with different seniority, liquidity, maturity, and risk, and sold to investors 
who do not have the origination capability of banks. 
Figure 3.1  Growth of outstanding CDS (LHS) and Development of securitisation (RHS). Sources: ISDA 
























































































































































































































































22 Since the collapse of Lehman on September 15, 2008 markets for credit risk have seen a sharp drop in liquidity and 
volume. The gross notional amounts outstanding worldwide for credit derivatives dropped from 54.6 trillion US dollars in 
December 2007 to 41.9 trillion US dollars in December 2008 (ECB, 2009).   41 
3.2  Longer intermediation chains  
Traditionally, banks were the dominant supplier of credit and the main source of maturity 
transformation in the economy. They were funded by short-term liabilities such as deposits and 
invested these funds in long-term illiquid assets that they held to maturity. In the decades before 
the crisis, however, the intermediation chain between ultimate borrower and ultimate lender 
grew (Adrian and Shin, 2010). Increasingly, households put their money in mutual funds; 
mutual funds in turn funded commercial banks by buying short-term paper; commercial banks 
funded securities brokers by buying repos; securities firms funded SPVs by buying their asset 
backed securities; and SPVs funded banks by buying their mortgages loans. Each part of this 
chain functions as a bank, borrowing short and lending long. The middle part of the longer 
intermediation chain, however, no longer funds itself through consumer deposits, but through 
the wholesale capital markets in which repos, ABSs, and short-term commercial paper are 
traded. 
As a result, market-based financial intermediaries, such as structured investment vehicles 
(SIVs), finance companies such as General Electric (GE), broker dealers, or banks such as 
Northern Rock, have increasingly taken over the role of traditional banks. They fund 
themselves by issuing (short-term) securities in wholesale markets instead of deposits. Because 
markets require collateral in return for funding, market-based intermediaries hold liquid, partly 
securitised, assets, which can be sold easily.  
In the pre crisis decades, the importance of relationship banking seemed to decline. 
Increasingly, the idea was that customers could be served from all over the world. In Germany, 
the head of its national development bank was dreaming of a ‘Kreditfabrik (loan factory), for 
processing standardised loans cheaply on behalf of many banks. The banks would deal with 
customers, as now; the factory would do the back-office work.’
23 Infomediaries such as Dun 
and Bradstreet and credit scoring models would facilitate this kind of outsourcing and 
specialisation. James Dimon, JPMorgan Chase’s boss, stated in a letter to shareholders that the 
bank's job was to deliver the right bundle of products at the right price. He said. “Where the 
products are ‘manufactured' is of little interest” to customers.
24 Petersen and Rajan (2002) find 
that in the U.S. the distance between small firms and their banks grew from 16 miles in the 
1970s to 68 miles in the 1990s. They interpret this as evidence that ‘the tyranny of distance’ in 
small business lending is slowly breaking.
25  
 
23 Economist, The loan factory, Apr 14th 2005 
24 Economist, The limits to size, May 18th 2006 
25 Degryse and Ongena (2004) argue that retail banking remains to a large extent local because they do not alter the 
fundamental trade-offs that determine the extent of exchange of information inside a bank, between firms and banks and 
between banks and banks.   42 
3.3  Increased interconnectedness 
Over the past decades, several developments have contributed to the increasing number of 
linkages among banks. Banks are lending more money to more banks in more countries. These 
connections arise through interbank markets, derivatives such as credit default swaps, 
securitised loans, and cross-border banking. The resulting increased interconnectedness of 
financial institutions implies a greater dependency between financial institutions with regard to 
liquidity risk, counterparty risk, and credit risk. How this increased interconnectedness can lead 
to the unexpected breakdown of parts of the financial system has been illustrated in the recent 
2007-2008 financial crises. 
An important source of interconnectedness is the interbank money market. As banks tend to 
hold over 10 percent of their assets in the form of deposits with other banks (Degryse e.a. 
2007), the failure of a counterparty could wipe-out a substantial part of bank capital. The 
internationalization of the banking sector over the past decades has increased the number of 
interbank cross-border connections (see figure 3.2). This internationalization of finance industry 
is driven by capital account liberalization, deregulation (including removal of restriction on 
foreign entry), the introduction of the euro, falling communication costs and more recently 
trends such as securitisation, the rise of hedge funds and the widespread use of special purpose 
vehicles (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2008, De Nicoló e.a. 2003). 
In addition, the commoditisation of financial transactions has contributed to the growing 
web of connections. An obvious example is the enormous growth in credit derivatives market, 
transferring the default risk on an underlying contract. As a result, a complicated network of 
cross-border credit risk exposures has arisen. Next to banks, large insurers and hedge funds are 
active in this (CDS) market, thereby creating connections with other industries as well. This is 
vividly illustrated by the rescue of AIG an international insurance cooperation in September 
2008. Authorities found that a failure would jeopardize the stability of the financial system, 
especially through its enormous exposure in the CDS market. 
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The consolidation and conglomeration within the financial industry has also contributed to 
interconnectedness. These trends have led to a set of so-called large complex financial 
institutions (LCFIs) that combine retail, corporate and investment banking with insurance 
services. These players have become central hubs at the core of the international financial 
system, connecting different markets and different regions. Their central function within the 
network has consequences for the stability of the network as a whole. 
3.4  Emergence of specialized intermediaries 
The increased importance of arm’s length financing has created a new group of participants in 
markets: private equity firms
26, venture capitalists, and hedge funds. They have re-
intermediated themselves between individual investors and markets. As the rise of ICT 
increased the complexity of products and the volume of information increased, many investors 
preferred to delegate their decisions to a specialist. Some specialists, like insurance companies 
and pension funds, focus on reducing transaction costs. Other firms, like hedge funds or venture 
capitalists, focus on profiting from specialist knowledge or skills. As a result, the share of direct 
investment by households in markets in the US has fallen, even though participation in equity 
markets has grown (Rajan, 2005). The world-wide growth in hedge funds is illustrated in figure 
3.3.  
Figure 3.3  Growth of transaction value of buyout investments in billions of Euros (Lhs) Source: 
presentation EVCA for the European Parliament, february 2008), number of hedge funds 


































































































































































Another, more recent development has been de rise of limited-purpose banks that specialize in 
particular products. Examples are credit card banks, subprime lenders and internet banks. The 
development of these institutions has been facilitated by the securitisation of loans, which has 
been the main financing channel for credit card banks since the early nineties (Yom 2005). 
These lenders also profited from advances in computational techniques, which they use for 
credit scoring their often high-risk customers. Together with the rise of internet, and advances 
 
26 See Boot and Thakor (2008).   44 
in payment systems, banks’ retail deposit services were increasingly handled through the 
internet. This made it possible to penetrate foreign retail markets quickly. 
Internet banking has partly replaced the brick-and-mortar branch. The costs of a pure 
internet bank are 100 times lower than its brick-and-mortar counter part (BIS, 2001). They are 
easy to set up and allow banks to enter financial markets at low costs. The contestability of 
markets has increased tremendously due to this new development. 
3.5  Consolidation 
In response to new technologies, deregulation and globalisation, the banking sector has 
consolidated (Group of Ten, 2001; Jones, 2008). Figure 3.4 shows the development of the 
number of banking organisations in the US, which almost halved between 1985 and 2003. In 
the US, most mergers and acquisitions were interbank mergers on the domestic market, 
although some mergers took place between banks and insurance companies. The same trend 
prevailed in Europe. Between 1990 and 2005, the number of banks in the four main euro area 
countries Germany, France, Italy and Spain decreased by 48% (Bikker and Bos , 2008).  
One possible explanation for the consolidation wave is that advances in communication and 
information technology increased the distribution capacity of banks, which enabled them to 
provide a larger array of services to a larger number of clients over a wider geographical region. 
This increased the competitive pressure in the industry, which has been a driving force behind 
bank consolidation over the past two decades. In this view, consolidation allowed banks to 
benefit from scale and scope economies, for example resulting from the implementation of 
information technology in the back office or from reducing marketing costs for brand naming. 
Although the empirical evidence for scale economies is limited (Bikker and Bos, 2008), this 
may be due to identification problems, as well as the fact that studies mostly use data which is 
almost two decades old.
27  
A second important rationale for consolidation lies in managers’ self-serving motives. De 
Young et al. (2009) find evidence for other non-profit maximisation motives for mergers and 
acquisitions, such as compensation schemes for top-level management that stimulated mergers 
even then this does not lead to efficiency gains, or too-big-to-fail subsidies that arise if banks 
become so large that market participants expect the government to step in to prevent default.  
 
27 Boot and Marinc (2008) point out that it is difficult to distinguish market power from scale economies. That increases in 
scale go hand in hand with a rise in market power and reduced competition in Europe is confirmed by studies that have 
measured competition over the past ten years (Bikker and Spierdijk, 2008; Van Leuvensteijn et al. 2007). Increased size 
may also help banks to obtain a “too-big-to-fail” status, which increases profitability as well by allowing banks to shift risk to 
the government, thereby reducing risk premia.   45 
Figure 3.4  Development of the distribution of banks according amount of assets in billions of dollars (Lhs) 




































































































































































































Deregulation facilitated the consolidation process by removing restrictions on permissible 
banking activities and geographical limitations on branching. In addition to these structural 
trends, the macroeconomic environment has influenced the consolidation process. In the 80’s, 
adverse macroeconomic developments put many banks under pressure, best evidenced by the 
Savings and Loans crisis in the US, which created a motive for banks to merge in order to avoid 
failure. Later, in the 90s, soaring stock markets provided banks with new opportunities, as in 
this environment banks could easily issue new shares to finance acquisitions. 
3.6  Higher leverage and more short-term funding 
Another important trend in the pre crisis decade was the changing structure of banks’ balance 
sheets. In general, banks fund their balance sheets through: demandable deposits, by issuing 
short-term liabilities (commercial paper, certificates of deposit, swapped foreign exchange 
liabilities, and wholesale deposits), by issuing long-term liabilities (consisting of subordinated 
debt, and hybrids, plus medium- and long-term senior debt), and by issuing equity. .  
In pre-crisis decades, banks became more dependent on short-term funding, and increased 
their leverage. Securitisation played a crucial role in this development. Banks can fund a larger 
fraction of their assets in wholesale markets if securitisation allows them to sell these assets as 
collateral. It increases the liquidity of banks’ assets and facilitated banks moving assets off-
balance sheet, which were subject to light capital requirements.  
Banks increasingly transferred assets they traditionally kept on their books to off-balance-
sheet vehicles, such as asset backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits and Structured 
Investment Vehicles (SIVs). They funded these conduits with a small amount of equity and a lot 
of short-term debt in the form of ABCP. In order to improve the credit ratings of these vehicles, 
they provided them with liquidity lines and credit enhancements. These enhancements gave 
investors recourse to banks’ funds in case the quality of assets deteriorated. Existing Basel rules 
treated such enhancements as capital-light. By shifting assets off-balance to special purpose 
vehicles that were funded with short-term liabilities, banks both raised their leverage and 
maturity mismatch by creating a “shadow” banking system.   46 
Figure 3.5 shows the amount of primary dealer (i.e., dealers that have a trading relationship 
with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York) repos and financial commercial paper as a 
fraction of M2. The steady growth shows the increasing reliance of financial intermediaries on 
this type of funding and the big drop during the crisis clearly shows how this funding channel 
dried up. Simultaneously, the percentage of U.S. banks that were able to fund at least two-thirds 
of their total assets with core deposits fell from nearly 91 percent to 59 percent between 1978 
and 2005 (Bradley and Shibut, 2006). 
Figure 3.5  Repos and financial commercial paper as a fraction of M2 (Source: Adrian and Shin, 2009) 
 
In addition to increasing off-balance sheet leverage in the shadow-banking system, banks also 
increased their on-balance sheet leverage. For example, average leverage of UK banks, defined 
as total assets divided by total equity excluding minority interest, increased from approximately 
25 to somewhat less than 35. Large differences between banks existed: minimum leverage 
hardly changed but maximum leverage roughly doubled. At the same time, these banks also 
became more dependent on short-term funding. The customer funding gap for UK banks, which 
measures the difference between banks’ debt to customers holding deposits and their assets, has 
been growing rapidly since the early 2000s (Bank of England Stability Report, October 2008). 
3.7  Performance-based remuneration 
Remuneration policies of financial institutions have become more performance-based, with 
larger components of variable salary. Figure 3.6 shows the increase in Wall Street bonuses since 
the 1980s. Deregulation and increased competition have been important factors behind the 
development of rewarding CEO’s with stock options. Philippon and Reshef (2009) find that   47 
deregulation accounts for 83% of changes in the relative compensation of the US financial 
sector with respect to the rest of the non-farm private sector from 1909 to 2006. Cunat and 
Guadalupe (2009) argue that deregulation and increased competition in the nineties triggered an 
increase in the variable component. 








































































































































John and Qian (2003) study the distribution of direct compensation from 1992-2000. They 
identify three noteworthy aspects. First, total direct compensation increases over the years. 
Second, option grants as a fraction of the level of salary also increased. In fact, the percentage 
of option grants in direct compensation has increased from 20 percent in 1992 to 54 percent in 
2000. Third, both the increase in total direct compensation and the increase in the number of 
option grants do not seem to be strongly correlated with stock performance. 
Amendments in tax and accounting rules may have contributed to the increase in variable 
incentive-related compensation. In particular the US congress passed an Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act that did not allow to deduct non-performance related compensation of 
managers in excess of 1$ million dollars for corporate tax income. The purpose of this Act was 
to diminish excessive CEO salary levels. In response to this Act many companies increased 
their cash allowances to below the threshold of 1 million dollars and began to add option grants 
to restore de facto the tax deductibility. 
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4  Scenarios 
In this chapter, which forms the core of our study together with chapter 5, we develop four 
scenarios for the financial sector to provide insights in possible future developments in the 
financial sector. The main questions in this section are twofold. First, what future scenarios do 
we foresee? Second, how does a particular scenario affect market structure, market failures, and 
government failures discussed in section 2? 
Section 3 provided insights in the main drivers behind past developments in the financial 
sector. We argued that developments in information and communication technology were the 
main factor driving developments in the financial sector. Also after the crisis, ICT will remain 
the driving factor behind our scenarios. Technological development affects economies of scope, 
the contractibility of transactions and the asymmetric information between buyers and sellers in 
financial markets. As we will argue in more detail below, the direction in which ICT influences 
these elements is not clear. 
Our scenarios are a tool to analyse the effectiveness of different policies. In some scenarios, 
policy makers have a different toolkit than in others, while even if the same type of policies are 
useful, priorities might differ. In section 5, we will discuss the various challenges faced by 
policymakers. 
Any scenario study should be clear about its limitations. Our scenarios do not describe all 
possible futures, but focus on a subset that aims to identify the main uncertainties relevant for 
policymakers. In addition, we do not give a detailed picture of those futures selected. Instead, 
we paint a broad-brush picture of each scenario, focusing on market structure, the effect on 
market failures, and the consequences for government failure. Also, we do not consider one 
scenario to be more likely than another. All scenarios can materialise and we have no view on 
how probable each scenario is. 
Finally, and most importantly, our scenarios arise through developments that policymakers 
cannot influence. In terms of this study, policymakers are not able to choose how important 
markets are relative to financial intermediation, whether banks add value by monitoring their 
clients or by generating soft information, and whether economies of scope are important or not. 
Instead, one day they will have to act in a certain scenario to increase welfare by reducing 
market failures and government failures. Nevertheless, in each of our scenarios, policymakers 
can influence the structure of the financial sector. For example, banks’ size or banks’ scope can 
be limited by limiting the size of banks’ balance sheets or the type of services banks are allowed 
to provide. However, the costs and benefits of such policy measures depend on the scenario that 
materialises.  
An analogy may help to clarify this point. Our four scenarios can be compared to four 
different landscapes, and the policymaker with a traveller who, being located at some particular 
point, wants to decide where to go and how to travel. The traveller cannot choose which 
landscape to travel in. Instead, the landscape exogenously arises. Whether the landscape is   50 
mountainous, has large forests, or deep rivers determines the time it takes to travel from one 
place to another. Of course, our traveller can a go to any particular point independent of what 
landscape materialises. But where a policymaker would want to travel, how he would travel and 
how long it would takes to get there, differs between different landscapes.  
4.1  Four scenarios for the financial sector 
Main driver  
As we have seen in section 2, information technology has played a major role in most pre-crisis 
developments. In this section, we argue that information technology will be the most important 
driver of change in the financial sector on a timescale of 20 years. Advances in information 
technology can affect the structure of the financial sector in different ways. As a result, four 
potential scenarios for the future of financial intermediation emerge. 
Soft versus hard information  
The first uncertainty that defines our scenarios is the impact of technological development on 
the relative importance of soft and hard information. Hard information is quantitative, 
verifiable, and can be easily stored or transmitted. As an example, when banks decide on 
whether or not to extend credit for a home mortgage loan, they may consult a borrower's 
income statement or credit card history. Another example is banks using credit-scoring models, 
which try to quantify credit risk based on measurable firm characteristics. Soft information, in 
contrast, is qualitative, non-verifiable, and can not easily be stored or transmitted. Stein (2002) 
defines it as ‘information that cannot be directly verified by anyone other than the agent who 
produces it.’ As an example, consider a loan officer who, through close, regular contact with a 
small-company, has come to believe that it faces good prospects and extends credit based on 
that subjective judgement.  
On the one hand, improved information technology may increase the role of hard 
information because it facilitates the gathering, storing, and transmitting of such information. 
Banks can use a borrower’s historic cash flow data, credit history, revenue, profits, stock market 
data etc. to determine the quality of a particular loan. As a result, advances in ICT may lead 
banks to rely more on hard information from data warehouses when assessing and monitoring a 
client’s creditworthiness, and less on soft information based on mutual trust and close 
consultation. 
A larger role for hard information has several effects. First, outsiders will be able to assess 
the quality of a bank’s assets more accurately. Because of this better assessment, investors will 
more readily buy securitised loans from banks. In addition, it will become easier to use ever 
more complex forms of securitisation. In this way, more hard information will enable banks to   51 
securitise loans and use increasingly complex forms of securitisation.
28 Second, the availability 
of hard data reduces the importance of distance. Statistics can travel the world in a spilt second 
and can be analysed everywhere. Thus, banks can supply services to clients all over the world 
without having a dense network of local offices. Third, companies will rely less on banks for 
financing. Investors are willing to finance these firms as they can make a reasonable judgement 
of the underlying credit risk, even when they are not in close contact with the companies’ 
management. Companies will then find it easier to tap financial markets directly by issuing 
bonds and commercial paper.  
On the other hand, improved information technology may increase to role of soft 
information because of several reasons. First, improved information technology can facilitate 
the collection of soft information, for example, because it makes frequent direct contact 
between banks’ account managers and their clients cheaper and easier, or by streamlining 
relationship management. Second, more hard information implies fiercer competition between 
banks offering commoditised financial services. Because soft information allows banks to gain 
a competitive edge over competitors, soft information may become banks’ prime source of 
rents. Banks will therefore focus on generating soft information.  
A larger role for soft information has a number of consequences. First, companies that have 
to seek their financing through the banking system will get tied in, as banks gain private 
knowledge on credit risk based on soft information and close contacts with management.  
Second, banks will have to stay in close touch with their clients. Effective monitoring will 
require regular, face-to-face contact. Hence, in a world where credit risk can only be predicted 
by knowing the borrower, banks need to be much closer to their customers compared to a 
situation where hard information suffices. The importance of distance will therefore increase. 
Third, Banks will acquire private information on the quality of their borrowers. This increases 
adverse selection in the secondary market because potential buyers of banks’ assets face a 
lemons problem. Banks’ assets will then become less liquid.  
Specialisation versus conglomeration  
The second uncertainty that defines our scenarios results from the impact of technological 
progress on the importance of scope economies. On the one hand, advances in information 
technology may allow an increasing array of financial products and services to be offered 
through the same distribution network. Once a bank has set up an advanced IT infrastructure, it 
may be able to integrate new products with small costs. Also, information technology may 
allow financial intermediaries to better reap the benefits of economies of scope between 
different services. For example, data mining may allow banks to approach their customers with 
 
28 Of course, this is a sliding scale. Information on some types of loans may be better than for other types of loans. The 
former are more likely to be accepted in securitised form than the latter. Some forms of securitisation will therefore always 
be possible.   52 
tailor-made business proposals. Or an analysis of the aggregate cash flow data of its clients may 
allow a bank to better assess credit risk or investment proposals. 
On the other hand, information technology may improve the possibilities to arrive at optimal 
outcomes through contractual relations. Information technology may help specialized firms in 
reaching their customers. For example, platform interfaces may function as intermediaries that 
help in bundling products from different providers. Also, improved search possibilities through 
the Internet may help firms in reaching customers. Where a bank could only approach its own 
clients with tailor-made business offers with relative ease, the internet and sophisticated data 
mining technology allows banks to reach non-clients more easily. In addition, ICT may 
facilitate the outsourcing of all kinds of activities, such as administration, quantitative data 
analysis, servicing clients etc. These developments reduce the advantage of conglomerates, and 
forces banks to focus on core activities instead.  
Four scenarios 
Based on these two uncertainties, we define four scenarios for the financial sector, graphically 
depicted in figure 4.1: Isolated Islands, Big Banks, Competing Conglomerates and Flat Finance. 
Below we discuss for each scenario what the financial sector will look like, and how the 
scenarios differ with regard to market failures and government failures. These differences will 
then be an important input in section 5, where we discuss the policy challenges faced in the 
various scenarios. 















4.2  Isolated Islands 
In this scenario, scope economies in the banking sector are relatively unimportant, while banks 
play a pivotal role in financing economic activity because they generate soft, relationship-
specific information through monitoring the credit status of companies and other customers.   53 
The latter implies that distance matters and banks are limited in their ability to securitise and 
sell their assets. Figure 4.2 summarizes the characteristics of the Isolated Islands scenario. 


















Policymakers face a landscape dominated by small, relatively locally oriented banks that 
specialize in offering different banking services, such as retail banking (e.g., deposit holding, 
mortgages, payments services, retail lending), corporate banking (e.g., cash management, trade 
finance, corporate lending, some structured finance) or investment banking (e.g., underwriting, 
mergers and acquisitions, market making, asset management, structured finance). Local 
companies seek financing from local banks that fund themselves through consumer deposits. 
Hence, bank assets are less geographically diversified. Although banks are of local nature, they 
may have branches in a limited number of other countries. The international banks that arise in 
this way are more aggregates of small local banks, than unified big international banks, given 
the informational costs in this scenario. Consumer deposits may also be of foreign origin.  
Direct credit markets are small: only large, international firms with ample cash are able to 
tap financial markets directly. Small and Medium Enterprises need banks to invest because they 
cannot invest sufficient own cash. At the same time, competition between banks is muted and 
SMEs pay high prices for access to financial resources. Once firms enter into a relation with a 
bank, they get tied in. If entry in a particular (national) market does take place, it is mainly due 
to mergers and acquisitions. For example, a foreign bank may take over a small local retail 
bank. The importance of soft information implies that geographical distance matters. Because 
soft information is not easily passed on, the chain between lender and borrower is small. 
Consequently, the hierarchical structure in banks is relatively flat.  
The importance of soft information also increases the opaque and information-intensive 
nature of banks’ assets. It is difficult to determine the market value of illiquid loans, which 
depends on soft, relationship-specific information. As a result, the loans granted by banks, e.g., 
mortgages, student loans, credit card debt, remain on their balance sheet until they mature,   54 
implying that banks’ business models do not revolve around securitisation and balance sheet 
management. This limits the amount of loans banks can provide. Because assets have limited 
value as collateral, banks fund themselves largely with deposits.  
In this scenario, the size of the financial sector in the Netherlands is limited, and focussed on 
providing credit, savings and payment facilities to Dutch firms and consumers. Bankruptcy of 
an individual bank does not create a systemic threat. To get a flavour of what such a market 
may look like, on may think of the banking sector in Germany, with its different types of local 
banks that have strong ties with their clients. 
How will the financial sector in the Netherlands change if the Isolated Islands scenario 
materializes? One possibility is that Dutch banks with large international activities will sell their 
oversees branches to foreign banks and will focus on serving clients in the Netherlands. As a 
result, the balance sheets of the large Dutch banks will shrink. Another possibility is that banks 
will formally remain international, but that these international banks will more or less function 
like strings of local banks. In addition, banks will get rid of, or outsource, non-core activities. 
This will make room in the market for specialized intermediaries. 
Mortgages in Isolated Islands 
In Isolated Islands, a consumer buying his first house will compare a number of offers of different banks. In several 
face-to-face meetings with account managers from different banks, he will try to find the lowest interest rate against the 
best conditions. The consumer will buy additional products, like insurance or private pension schemes from other 
financial intermediaries. The banks he compares will be  well-known national banks and may even be banks that 
specialize regionally. Banks compete quite fiercely for such first-time clients. From the banks’ point of view, these new 
clients  are  blank  slates,  whose creditworthiness  will  be  revealed  during  the course  of  a  long-term  relationship.  A 
consumer who already has a mortgage or a substantial credit history, however, will visit his current bank first and will 
most likely get a good offer. A house-owner who needs other loans, for example for buying a car or temporary credit, 
will also visit his mortgage lender. The bank scrutinizes such second time clients carefully. Local account managers 
are consulted and their opinion weighs heavily in deciding whether or not the client gets additional credit, or whether 
his credit is renewed. When he visits other banks, these will most likely offer higher interest rates. When a consumer 
switches banks, this is seen as a signal of low creditworthiness. Regulators should carefully watch new banks that 
grow quickly because they will probably extend relatively many loans to clients with a low creditworthiness. 
 
Market failures 
In this scenario, the presence of soft information hampers corporate governance, i.e., the 
potential for a bank’s financiers to align their interest with those of the bank through monitoring 
and intervention. For two reasons, creditors have difficulty monitoring banks. First, because 
banks mainly fund themselves through deposits, and depositors are bad monitors due to their 
large numbers and relative ignorance, corporate governance suffers. Second, debt and equity 
holders have difficulties obtaining good information on the quality of banks’ assets and are 
unable to judge the creditworthiness of banks’ borrowers. On the other hand, compared to 
conglomerate banks, the specialized banks in this scenario have relatively simple balance   55 
sheets, consisting of a limited number of products. This improves corporate governance by 
facilitating monitoring. 
Informational spillovers arise if an event arising at one bank generates new information 
about other banks. For example, the holders of a banks short-term debt may learn that some 
banks are in trouble, but not which banks. As a result, depositors will withdraw their funding 
also from healthy banks. As information asymmetry between banks and their financiers 
increases, the probability for such sudden regime switches grows. 
Interconnectedness decreases if banks fund themselves to a lesser extent through wholesale 
interbank markets. Soft information reduces banks’ ability to use the loans on their balance 
sheet as collateral for funding. It also limits the possibilities to move assets off-balance sheet to 
other investors. Specialisation increases the level of interconnectedness, because specialized 
firms need to fund themselves in some way, and part of this funding will come from other 
financial firms. Table 4.1 summarizes the above discussion. 
Table 4.1  Market Failures 
Market failure  Soft information  Specialisation 
     
Corporate governance  Less effective  More effective 
Information spillovers  Increases  Decreases 
Interconnectedness  Decreases  Increases 
 
Government failures 
The importance of soft information increases the information gap between the regulator and 
banks. In addition, makes it more difficult for politicians or other regulatory institutions to 
monitor the regulator. As a result, the probability of regulatory capture increases. Specialisation, 
on the other hand, decreases the information gap because it reduces the complexity of banks’ 
balance sheets. 
Governments can more easily commit to a particular intervention strategy, the more difficult 
it is to hide the fact that a bank is in trouble, and the less of a systemic threat a particular bank’s 
failure poses. As soft information becomes more important, commitment becomes more 
difficult because it is easier to hide potential problems and postpone intervention. On the other 
hand, if banks specialize, their size will decrease. This effect is enhanced by the local nature of 
banks, which keeps them relatively small. The failure of smaller banks is less likely to have 
systemic consequences. As a result, commitment becomes easier.  
In this scenario, banks depend on geographical proximity to their clients. Because banks are 
unable to relocate their business to other countries without losing revenues, lowering regulatory 
standards will not attract many new banks. This makes international coordination easier. Table 
4.2 summarizes the above discussion.   56 
Table 4.2  Government failures 
Government failure  Soft information  Specialisation 
     
Capture  More probable  Less probable 
Commitment  Easier  Easier 
Coordination  Easier  - 
 
Summary 
To summarize, the Isolated Islands scenario scores low on interconnectedness and has average 
scores on all other market failures as is shown in figure 4.3. It scores maximally on coordination 
and relatively good on commitment. Capture remains an issue because of the information gap 
between regulator and regulated, although, as we will see, not as severe as in other scenarios. 
Other government failures are relatively unimportant, because banks are local and small. 












4.3  Big (local) Banks 
This scenario differs from Isolated Islands because scope economies are important. We thus 
assume that developments in ICT allows banks to realise more economies of scope between 
different banking activities. This implies that banks are bigger and balance sheets more 
complex. Banks generate soft information during their relationship with their clients. Therefore, 
banks cannot easily securitise their assets and consequently strongly rely on deposits for 
funding. The importance of soft information for monitoring credit risk also implies that banks 
need to be located close to their customers. Figure 4.4 summarizes the characteristics of these 
Big Banks scenario.   57 


















In this scenario, distance is still important and banks’ activities are concentrated in the domestic 
market. Cross-border activity is relatively limited. The existence of scope economies creates 
barriers to entry and leads to bigger banks. In contrast with Isolated Islands, a few big banks, 
which supply a wide range of banking services, dominate the financial sector. This implies that 
banks are complex institutions with a wide range of assets and liabilities on their balance sheet. 
In addition, competition is limited, as new firms have to enter in multiple markets 
simultaneously. Given the limited possibility to securitise loans, these banks depend mainly on 
consumer deposits for funding. Direct credit markets are small. Local companies seek financing 
from these large local banks, which implies that bank assets are less geographically diversified.  
To get some feel of what such a financial sector may look like, one can look at certain 
aspects of the Japanese financial sector. Japanese banks have close ties with their customers and 
provide a broad range of services to their clients. 
How will the financial sector in the Netherlands change if the big banks scenario 
materializes? If we move towards big banks, the financial sector in the Netherlands will see 
further concentration, because the few specialized banks that currently exist will be taken over 
by local banks. These remaining banks will concentrate on local markets and reduce their 
foreign activities. Competition for many financial products will be muted because financial 
products are bundled together.   58 
Mortgages in Big Banks 
In Big Banks, a consumer buying his first house will compare a number of offers of different banks. In addition, the 
consumer will buy other products, like insurance or private pension schemes from the same bank. Based on face-to-
face meetings, the consumer will decide which bank to choose by comparing the offer for a bundle of products, including 
payments and savings accounts. The banks he compares will be well-known, relatively large national banks. The banks 
may cross-subsidize between products in their bundle. For example, they will offer low interest rates, but realize high 
returns  on  insurance  products  or  credit  card  services.  Banks  compete  fiercely  for  such  first-time  clients.  Once  a 
mortgage is sold, other commercial units within the bank are notified and will approach the client with business offers. 
From the banks point of view, these new clients are blank slates, whose creditworthiness will be revealed during the 
course of a long-term relationship. The bank scrutinizes second time clients carefully. Local account managers are 
consulted and their opinion weighs heavily in deciding whether or not the client gets additional credit, or whether his 
credit is renewed. Information from other sources within the bank may also play a role in rejecting or accepting a client. 
In addition, local account managers are constantly monitoring their clients and try to find out whether they may need 




In this scenario, the presence of soft information hampers corporate governance for the same 
reasons as in Isolated Islands. In this case, however, balance sheets are complex due to the large 
number of different products banks offer their clients. This further limits effective corporate 
governance. Conglomeration increases the complexity of balance sheets, which increases 
information asymmetry between those inside and those outside the bank. This results in a larger 
probability for information spillovers. Finally, relative to a financial sector populated with 
specialists, conglomeration reduces interconnectedness because there is more scope for internal 
funding markets. Table 4.3 summarizes the above discussion. 
Table 4.3  Market Failures 
Market failure  Soft information  Conglomeration 
     
Corporate governance  Less effective  Less effective 
Information spillovers  Increases  Increases 
Interconnectedness  Decreases  Decreases 
 
Government failures 
As we have seen, soft information increases the information gap between regulator and banks. 
Conglomeration further increases this information asymmetry because it increases the 
complexity of banks’ balance sheets. It also increases banks’ size. The scope for regulatory 
capture is therefore particularly large in this scenario. Because banks are bigger and more 
complex balance sheets increase information asymmetry, governments will find it more difficult 
to commit to a particular intervention strategy compared to the isolated islands scenario. 
International coordination is unproblematic, for the same reasons as in the Isolated Islands 
scenario. Table 4.4 summarizes the above discussion.   59 
Table 4.4  Government failures 
Government failure  Soft information  Conglomeration 
     
Capture  More probable  More probable 
Commitment  Less difficult  More difficult 
Coordination  Less difficult  - 
 
Summary 
To summarize, the Big Banks scenario scores maximally governance failure, has high 
informational spillovers and has low interconnectedness (see figure 4.5). Big Banks scores good 
on coordination and average on commitment. Capture, however, is particularly problematic in 
this scenario because the regulator faces relatively big banks as well as a larger information gap.  












4.4  Competing Conglomerates  
In the competing conglomerate scenario, we assume that advances in information technology 
have created scope economies in the banking industry. In addition, information asymmetries in 
the direct credit market are reduced to such extent that many firms can tap financial markets 
directly. For the same reason, securitisation of bank assets is thriving. This also implies that 
distance is no longer an obstacle to interact with customers or to find funding. Figure 4.6 
summarizes the characteristics of the Competing Conglomerates scenario.   60 


















In this scenario, the financial sector consists of large, international conglomerates that can 
easily reallocate headquarters from one country to another. Because information is ‘hard’, the 
chain between lender and borrower can be long, and banks can have extensive hierarchical 
structures. Thus, policymakers face large internationally active banks that are centrally led and 
cross-subsidize between many different banking activities. In a small country such as The 
Netherlands, most banks are foreign, except maybe one or two domestic conglomerates.  
Assets move relatively easily off banks’ balance sheets. This allows financial institutions such 
as hedge funds and money market funds to play an important role in financial markets. These 
institutions an important source of funding for banks in addition to consumer deposits, because 
they invest in securitised loans. A relative large part of finance bypasses the banking system as 
companies can directly tap capital markets. Borrowers can shop around for the best deal, as 
information on their creditworthiness is transferable. Banks therefore compete fiercely for 
business 
This type of banking system is dominated by large foreign players and can be compared to 
that of some eastern European countries. Large banks from other countries such as Germany, 
Austria or the Netherlands are very active in, for example, Poland or Hungary. 
How will the financial sector in the Netherlands change if the competing conglomerates 
scenario materializes? If we move towards competing conglomerates, existing big Dutch banks 
are likely to be taken over by foreign ones. Of course, one of the big banks may remain Dutch, 
but this will be largely by coincidence.   61 
Mortgages in Competing Conglomerates 
In Competing Conglomerates, a consumer buying his first house will compare a number of offers of different banks. The 
banks he compares will be large international banks. He will search for these offers and approach the banks largely 
trough the internet. In addition, the consumer will buy other products, like insurance or private pension schemes from 
the same bank. The consumer will decide which bank to choose by comparing the offer for a bundle of products, 
including payments and savings accounts. When the bank and a client negotiate actual offers, the bank requires a large 
amount of data, salary records, data on personal circumstances, data from credit card accounts, etc. This data plays an 
important role in the banks’ acceptance decision. Banks minimize face-to-face contact with their clients and cross-
subsidize between products in their bundle. During their relationship with a client, banks use software packages to 
scrutinize  his  transactions  on  a  day-to-day  basis.  These  packages  generate  automatic  offers  whenever  sales 
opportunities arise. Once a loan has been made, the bank sells the loan to an investment vehicle. 
 
Market failures 
In this scenario, the presence of hard information facilitates monitoring of banks. This improves 
corporate governance because banks’ creditors are better able to assess the risks that bank 
management takes. On the other hand, the complexity of the balance sheets of conglomerate 
banks decreases the effectiveness of monitoring, which hampers corporate governance. 
Hard information reduces information asymmetry between banks and their creditors. This 
reduces the potential for information spillovers. On the other hand, conglomeration increases 
the complexity of banks’ balance sheets. This increases the opaqueness of banks’ balance 
sheets, and hence the potential for informational spillovers.  
Interconnectedness increases if banks fund themselves to a larger proportion through 
wholesale interbank markets. Because banks generate and use hard information instead of soft 
information, the value created by a bank-customer relationship is less bank-specific. As a result, 
when a bank goes bankrupt, a large part of the value embedded in its loan portfolio will be 
transferable to other banks. Thus, hard information allows banks to use their loans as collateral 
for wholesale funding, and gives them the ability to move assets off-balance sheet to other 
investors quickly. Table 4.5 summarizes the above discussion. 
Table 4.5  Market Failures 
Market failure  Hard information  Conglomeration 
     
Corporate governance  More effective  Less effective 
Information spillovers  Decreases  Increases 
Interconnectedness  Increases  Decreases 
 
Government failures 
Hard information decreases the information gap between regulator and banks. As a result, the 
probability of regulatory capture decreases. Conglomeration, on the other hand, increases the 
information gap because it increases the complexity of banks’ balance sheets. Both hard 
information and conglomeration result in bigger banks. Because banks are increasingly too-big-
to-fail, it becomes more difficult for governments to commit to a particular intervention   62 
strategy. Because banks can successfully relocate their business to other countries without 
losing revenues, lowering regulatory standards will attract new banks. This makes international 
coordination more difficult. Table 4.6 summarizes the above discussion. 
Table 4.6  Government failures 
Government failure  Hard information  Conglomeration 
     
Capture  Less probable  More probable 
Commitment  More difficult  More difficult 
Coordination  More difficult  - 
 
Summary 
To conclude, Competing Conglomerate scores average on corporate governance, informational 
spillovers, and interconnectedness. Competing Conglomerates has a high probability of capture, 
because we assume that the costs of a larger size outweighs the benefits of more hard 
information because banks become very large. In addition, commitment and coordination are 
central issues because banks are large and footloose (see figure 4.7).  












4.5  Flat Finance 
In this scenario, economies of scope in the banking sector are absent and information 
technology reduces asymmetric information problems. This implies that banks become less 
important and that firms can finance investment by issuing bonds, commercial paper and other 
tradable securities. Hence, relation specific information is not particularly valuable and distance 
is no obstacle when serving customers or finding investors. Banks can securitise and trade a 
wide range of loans and other financial products, which provides an additional source of 
funding. Financial institutions other than traditional banks, such as money market funds,   63 
security broker-dealers, hedge funds or special purpose vehicles also engage in maturity 
transformation. Figure 4.8 summarizes the characteristics of the Flat Finance scenario. 


















Policymakers face a landscape of many different types of banks specialized in, for example, 
retail banking, corporate banking, investment banking, or transaction banking. These firms 
operate on international level: financial intermediaries can serve their customers from anywhere 
in the world, which means that in all these market domestic institutions compete head-on with 
foreign banks. Cross-subsidization is largely absent and firms shop around for the best service 
and the lowest interest rate. Because banks have little that binds them locally, financial 
intermediaries can credibly threaten to relocate their business to another country.  
In these international hubs, financial markets play an important role. Banks depend on 
markets for funding and risk sharing, while many firms can find financing through issuing 
commercial paper and long-term bonds. These securities are sold to non-bank financial 
institutions, such as hedge and money market funds from all over the world. Maturity and 
liquidity transformation thus also takes place outside the banking sector. Local financial 
systems are typically interconnected through financial markets with the world’s financial 
centres as important “nodes” within this network, even though the degree of interconnectedness 
varies from country to country. In term of market failures, this scenario’s weakness is the 
interconnected nature of the system. Individual banks or other financial intermediaries do not 
take into account the effect of their actions on markets and or on other financial firms. 
Current examples of what this scenario might look like are the international market-based 
financial systems of Wall Street, The City, or Singapore, where internationally active, 
sometimes relatively specialized banks dominate. 
How will the financial sector in the Netherlands change if the Flat Finance scenario 
materializes? In that case, banks will specialize, some banks may survive and may even expand   64 
internationally, other banks will be subject to international take-over bids, and there will be 
many entrants on the Dutch financial market. 
Mortgages in Flat Finance 
In Flat Finance, a consumer seeking a mortgage will look for the lowest interest rate through the internet. The bank he 
finds will be a large international bank, for example located in the U.S. or Germany. The consumer will buy other 
products, like insurance or private pension schemes from other specialized financial intermediaries. When the bank and 
a  client  negotiate  actual  offers,  the  bank  requires  a  large  amount  of  data,  salary  records,  data  on  personal 
circumstances, data from credit card accounts, etc. This data plays an important role in the banks’ acceptance decision. 
Banks  minimize  face-to-face  contact  with  their  clients  and  contact  is  mainly  through  a  specialized  helpdesk.  This 




In Flat Finance, the combination of hard information and relatively simple balance sheets 
facilitates monitoring and hence allow for effective corporate governance. Hard information and 
specialisation both reduce information asymmetry between banks and their creditors. This 
reduces the potential for information spillovers. As in the competing conglomerates scenario, 
interconnectedness increases compared to Isolated Islands or Big Banks because the availability 
of hard information allows for long financing chains. In Flat Finance, however, 
interconnectedness increases compared to these scenarios because specialist banks fund 
themselves partly by borrowing from other financial intermediaries. Table 4.7 summarizes the 
above discussion. 
Table 4.7  Market Failures 
Market failure  Hard information  Specialisation 
     
Corporate governance  More effective  More effective 
Information spillovers  Decreases  Decreases 
Interconnectedness  Increases  Increases 
 
Government failures 
Hard information and specialisation both decreases the information gap between regulator and 
banks. As a result, the probability of regulatory capture decreases compared to Competing 
Conglomerates. Although specialisation reduces banks’ size, they will still be large relative to 
the Isolated Island or the Big (local) Banks scenario. Compared to these scenarios, 
interconnectedness also comes into play, because banks may now be too-interconnected-to-fail. 
This makes it more difficult for governments to commit to a particular intervention strategy. 
Because banks can successfully reallocate their business to other countries without losing 
revenues, lowering regulatory standards will attract new banks. This makes international 
coordination more difficult. Table 4.8 summarizes the above discussion.   65 
Table 4.8  Government failures 
Government failure  Hard information  Specialisation 
     
Capture  Less probable  Less probable 
Commitment  More difficult  Easier 
Coordination  More difficult  - 
 
Summary  
To conclude, the Flat Finance scenario combines high interconnectedness with effective 
corporate governance, and limited informational spillovers. Flat Finance scores badly on 
international coordination. It scores relatively well on capture because information asymmetry 
is limited. Commitment remains an important issue because of the size of banks, but also 
because banks may be too-interconnected-to-fail, as shown in figure 4.9. 












   66 
5  Policy challenges 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, The G20 launched a reform agenda that covers a broad 
range of themes, ranging from ‘Building high quality capital and liquidity standards and 
mitigating procyclicality’, to ‘Broadening the scope of regulation of hedge funds’.
29 Other 
international standard-setting bodies and international financial organizations that play an 
important role in developing new initiatives are the FSB, BCBS, BIS and the IMF.  
Most recently, the BCBS has reached agreement on higher capital buffers for banks. The 
minimum common equity ratio, the highest form of capital, will increase from the current 2% 
level to 4,5% by January 2015 and the Tier 1 capital requirement will increase from 4% to 6% 
over the same period. These measures imply an improvement in the required quality of capital, 
of which the total regulatory minimum stays at 8% of risk-weighted assets. However, banks 
also need to build-up a capital conservation buffer of 2,5% above this minimum that can be 
drawn in times of crisis. Doing so requires banks to constrain earnings distributions, such as 
bonuses and dividend payments, as these earnings need to be used to restore the buffer. The 
new rules also introduce a non-risk-based minimum Tier 1 leverage ratio of 3% as backstop to 
the risk-based measures above. In addition, two minimum liquidity ratios are introduced. A 
liquidity coverage ratio, which defines a minimum of high quality, liquid assets relative to the 
potential liquidity needs over the next 30 days under a stress scenario and a net stable funding 
ratio, which equates the available amount of stable longer-term funding (>1 year) to the 
required amount, derived from the characteristics of both assets and liabilities on the bank’s 
balance sheet. 
The EU has taken policy initiatives in each of the areas defined by the G20. Recent 
examples are the proposed rules for hedge funds and private equity as well as the establishment 
of a EU network of bank resolution funds, aimed at protecting the taxpayer from the cost of 
resolving failing banks. These proposals recently won the backing of European Union finance 
ministers, although the UK (which hosts about 80% of hedge funds in Europe) pushes to water-
down the agreement. In addition, the EU has developed a financial supervision package that 
includes measures to establish a two-pillar structure of a European Systemic Risk Board, which 
shall be responsible for the macro prudential oversight of the EU financial system as a whole, 
alongside a European System of Financial Supervisors. Thereby, the EU aims to monitor 
financial stability on a European wide level. The EU is also in the process of harmonizing their 
deposit guarantee systems. 
In the US, financial regulation has been strengthened through the Dodd-Frank bill that 
passed congress in July 2010. This bill includes new regulations for hedge funds and credit 
 
29 In particular, the themes are: Building high quality capital and liquidity standards and mitigating procyclicality; Reforming 
compensation practices to support financial stability; Improving over-the-counter derivatives markets; Addressing 
systemically important financial institutions and cross-border resolutions; Strengthening adherence to international 
supervisory and regulatory standards; Strengthening accounting standards; Developing macro prudential policy frameworks 
and tools; Broadening the scope of regulation of hedge funds; and strengthen oversight of credit rating agencies.   67 
rating agencies, measures to discourage financial institutions from growing excessively large or 
becoming too complex, the creation of an orderly liquidation mechanism to unwind 
systemically significant institutions in order to prevent future bailouts by the taxpayer 
(including a living will) and limits proprietary trading. In addition, the bill simplifies the 
fragmented supervisory structure, establishes a Financial Stability Oversight Council that aims 
to address systemic risk as well as a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which consolidates 
consumer protection responsibilities and strengthens such protection by regulating mortgages 
and credit cards. 
We distinguish between four categories of policy challenges. First, how should we monitor 
financial instability? What type of information is important; to what extent should monitoring 
of financial stability be centralized internationally; should the role of monitor of financial 
stability be integrated with the role of regulator? 
Second, how should we reduce government failure? Policymakers can reduce government 
failures by changing institutional structure of financial sector regulation, by increasing the role 
of market information, by introducing third-party monitoring of regulators, by increasing 
transparency, by attracting better personnel, and by introducing the right kind of accountability. 
Third, what type of ex ante prudential regulation should be in place? To reduce systemic 
risk, supervisors can use regulation of incentives (regulation of remuneration policies, capital 
requirements, liquidity charges, counter cyclical capital buffers), resort to quantity regulation 
(minimum liquidity buffers, maximum leverage ratios, limitations on size, or restrictions of 
banking activities), and increase market discipline (no-bailout clauses, contingent capital, 
prompt corrective action). How should we improve the regulation of financial markets, i.e., 
OTC markets, credit rating agencies, central-clearing parties, and financial innovations? 
Finally, how should regulators intervene ex post, i.e., once potential threats to financial 
stability have materialized? Policymakers can reduce systemic risk by extending the ex post 
crisis safety net, which prevents financial intermediaries from defaulting or reduces the fall-out 
from such a default. Examples of such measures are public guarantees for bank loans, lender of 
last resort, living wills and bank specific bankruptcy laws, Prompt Corrective Action and 
contingent capital. 
As we will argue below, the effectiveness of particular policy measures will often differ 
between scenarios. The driving forces of these differences are the complexity of balance sheets, 
the ability to coordinate policy internationally, the information gap faced by regulators, the size 
of banks’ balance sheets, the tradability of banks’ assets, the level of interconnectedness, the 
potential for market discipline, and the threat of regulatory capture. The financial sector needs a 
different type of regulation when markets play a major role than when this is not the case. To 
optimize the mitigation of market and government failures the prioritization of the different 
types of regulation may differ between the scenarios.    68 
5.1  Isolated islands 
The most important market failures that regulation needs to address in this scenario are banks’ 
failing corporate governance and information spillovers. From the viewpoint of policy, this is a 
benevolent scenario, because government failures such as regulatory capture are limited 
compared to other scenarios. Policymakers can focus on enhancing bank regulation and 
supervision, without having to worry too much about international cooperation and 
developments in foreign markets. At the same time, risks originate mainly from within the local 
financial system and can thus be monitored and tackled. Bank supervisors have a firm grip on 
the relatively small local banks. 
Monitoring financial stability 
Since banks are locally oriented specialists that fund themselves largely with deposits, credit 
risks to the banking system come largely from within the local economic and financial system. 
This makes identifying potential threats to financial stability easier. Policies aimed at 
preventing financial instability are therefore more effective. Such policies could target the 
deflation of a house price bubble or could aim at increasing buffers in the banking systems 
when economic growth is strong. Because information spillovers are a source of systemic risk, a 
particular challenge in this scenario is to identify correlated exposures within the banking 
system. Because banks are specialists, supervision should monitor many different types of 
financial institutions. 
Because outsiders have difficulties assessing the quality of banks’ assets, the value that 
banks’ represent to their owners depends largely on the value of banks’ reputation. Changes in 
market valuation therefore indicate a loss of reputation and a lack of trust. Such changes do not 
automatically imply impending risks, but they do warrant scrutiny by the regulatory. 
Although bank loans are local, international links between financial systems may still arise 
from traded financial instruments. In this scenario, these investments are largely kept and traded 
on behalf of customers, which reduces their threat to banks’ stability. On the liability side, 
international linkages may stem from cross-country deposit holdings. While banks are local on 
the assets side, they may be more international on the liabilities side. Coordination of deposit 
guarantee systems will be easier because banks business is local and therefore banks cannot 
easily relocate to other countries. 
Reducing government failure 
Government failures due to capture and implicit guarantees are relatively mild in this scenario, 
because banks are small and the information gap between regulator and banks limited. Due to 
banks’ local orientation, international coordination is less important, and at the same time 
possible on those issues where it is needed, such as DGS.   69 
Although government failures are relatively benign in this scenario, one potential way to 
reduce remaining threats is to increase transparency or reporting obligations. The transparent 
way in which the US FDIC reports on banks under its supervision could be a role model for 
regulators. The FDIC maintains an online database that contains detailed information on the 
balance sheets of the banks under its supervision on a quarterly basis. For example, it reports on 
nonperforming loans, an overview of the banks liabilities, a measure of interest rate risk, it lists 
the various components of bank capital, etc. 
Ex ante prudential supervision 
Financial regulation is largely a national matter. Although balance sheets are relatively simple 
(local loans and retail as well as wholesale deposits are the main items), soft information is 
necessary to evaluate credit risk and bank loans are not traded but in principle kept to maturity. 
Supervisors will therefore find it difficult to assess the risk that these assets will default at some 
point in time. Market prices provide an imperfect measure of this probability, because they are 
distorted by the expected losses from the bank-specific nature of these assets. Hence, assessing 
banks’ capital ratios is a challenge in this scenario and risk-adjusted capital regulation address 
systemic risk rather imperfectly. Instead of trying to fine-tune the pricing of risk through capital 
requirements, regulators should use simple indicator such as high growth rates, questionable 
marketing strategies, excessive bonus schemes, or high leverage ratios, that trigger close 
scrutiny of a bank by the regulator. Because information is soft, such scrutiny implies sending 
specialized teams into the banks to check the quality of a banks’ balance sheet and the risk of its 
business.  
Bank supervision could also target the banks’ board and try to ensure members of the board 
are independent and critical. For example, the regulator could appoint at least one member of 
the board, or could hold regular undisclosed meetings with individual board members.  
Another challenge in this scenario is to find the right balance between limiting risks in the 
banking sector and reaping the benefits of an innovative and competitive financial industry. As 
bank supervisors have a firm grip on local oriented banks, there might be a tendency to reduce 
risks to such extent that new entrance and innovation are hampered. This may lead to high 
prices for bank product and a stagnant, inflexible financial sector. Therefore, some 
countervailing power might be necessary, for example in the form of a strong competition 
authority that prevents cartelisation of the banking market.  
Ex post crisis management  
The US experience during the current and earlier crises has proven the value of a special bank 
bankruptcy law in combination with a framework for prompt corrective action (PCA), 
especially when it comes to dismantling small local banks. PCA limits losses for the financial 
system and thus the economy by placing a mix of discretionary and mandatory restrictions on 
banks’ activities, including limitations on dividend payments, compensation schemes,   70 
transactions, or appointing a representative in a banks’ board of directors. Early intervention 
and mandatory actions reduce the potential for regulatory forbearance. The UK recently 
introduced a bank resolution framework, as one of the first lessons from the crisis. In a scenario 
where the financial system consists mainly of local banks, there is a clear-cut case for 
introducing a PCA framework. 
A challenge for crisis management is that many bank assets are not tradable. This increases 
the risk a solvent bank will face liquidity problems, as it cannot easily sell its assets. The 
potential demand for the lender of last resort function of the central bank thus also increases. To 
perform this function, however, the central banks should be prepared to accept non-tradable 
bank loans. 
In this scenario, banks are crucial in financing SMEs investments. The government can 
reduce the fallout from reduced bank lending by guaranteeing the loans made to such firms. 
However, at the same time governments should provide incentives to banks to monitor these 
borrowers. In addition, such guarantees should not be allowed to crowd out other private 
investors. 
5.2  Big Banks 
In this scenario, corporate governance failure and information spillovers are the important 
market failures that regulation needs to address. These market failures are more severe than in 
Isolated Islands. In addition, the threat of regulatory capture and a lack of commitment hamper 
effective regulation. Policy challenges stem from the concentration of the banking system and 
the severity of asymmetric information of regulators vis-à-vis banks due to opaque assets and 
complex balance sheets. Policy makers should give priority to policies that reduce these 
problems and can do so without having to worry about international coordination, as banks 
cannot credibly threaten to move their businesses elsewhere. Because risks stem from within the 
local financial-economic system, ex ante measures can be effective.  
Monitoring financial stability 
As in Isolated Islands, risk will come mainly from within the local economic or financial system 
because, seen from the assets side, banks are local. Therefore, local policymakers can more 
easily implement policies that mitigate threats to stability. In Big Banks, the local financial 
conglomerate are too-big-to-fail. A threat to either one of these banks constitutes a threat to 
financial stability. Monitoring financial stability implies monitoring the risk to these large 
banks. Although interconnectedness is low, information asymmetry is high, and a crisis may 
spread through information spillovers.  
Because outsiders have difficulties in assessing the quality of banks’ assets, a banks’ value 
depends on its reputation, whether investors trust the bank. Hence, changes in market valuation 
indicate a loss of reputation and do not automatically imply the materialisation of risk, but they   71 
do warrant scrutiny by the regulator. Supervisors could also try to use information from 
competing banks. In this case, a challenge would be to devise mechanisms that would elicit 
credible information. 
Reducing government failure 
Given that these big banks combine many different banking functions, balance sheets will be 
complex because they consist of many different non-tradable assets. As a result, supervisors 
will have an information disadvantage and it will be even harder for outsiders to judge whether 
or not a regulator is taking the correct action. As a result, regulatory forbearance is a substantial 
threat. At the same time, banks tend to be too-big-to-fail and markets expect that governments 
will guarantee bank assets. Such implicit guarantees induce banks to take excessive risk. 
Policies should therefore focus on restoring the power balance between the banks and the 
supervisor and reducing government failures. Institutional design can be an important 
instrument to reduce regulatory capture. If different regulatory bodies perform different 
regulatory tasks, they can monitor each other to some extent. Other policy measures include 
arranging regular external visitations of a supervisor, counteracting powerful financial lobby 
groups by funding independent research (as an example, take the recent BIS study on the effect 
of higher capital ratios (BIS, 2010)), or increasing the public transparency on career changes 
that a supervisor’s employees make. In addition, regulators should prevent their employees 
from developing long-term relations with any particular bank. 
Ex ante prudential supervision 
The information asymmetry between the bank and the regulator cannot easily be reduced. This 
limits the effectiveness of regulation that requires detailed information on bank assets, such as 
risk-adjusted capital regulation. Instead of trying to fine-tune the pricing of risk through capital 
requirements, regulators should use simple indicators that trigger scrutiny by a specialized 
intervention team. Such indicators may include high growth rates, questionable marketing 
strategies, excessive bonus schemes, high leverage ratios, or substantial activity in the trading of 
financial innovative products. 
In addition, the focus of regulation could shift from incentive to quantity regulation, 
restrictions on banks’ activities (such as the Volcker rule
30), charges based on size, or limits to 
the amount of deposits a bank can manage may help to get a grip on large banks. In addition, in 
a situation where the financial system consists of only a few large banks, supervisors should 
consider to limit mutual exposure between these few banks. Bank supervision could also target 
the banks’ board and try to ensure members of the board are independent and critical. 
 
30 The Volcker rule restricts banks from making certain kinds of speculative investments if they are not on behalf of their 
customers, such as proprietary trading and owning a hedge fund or private equity fund.   72 
For the working of the national deposit guarantee system (DGS) it is important to anticipate 
the quantitative impact of bank failures, as the system as a whole is likely to be under strain 
when this happens. 
In this scenario, banks have substantial market power. Banks offer bundles of products and 
bank borrowers face substantial switching costs when they want to change banks. To reduce the 
welfare loss associated with pricing and inefficiency in monopolistic markets, stimulating 
competition is important. 
Ex post crisis management 
Enhancing the crisis management toolkit of supervisors should have priority in this scenario. 
This is especially important because a well-designed toolbox can reduce the need for a 
government bailout in this scenario and thus the expectation thereof, while it also reduces the 
impact of a bank failure when it occurs. The “too-big-to fail” problem can be reduced by 
installing a framework for the orderly liquidation of banks. Policies that help in this regard are 
measures to protect the payment system from a bank failure, a living will for large banks, or a 
PCA framework that facilitates early intervention. Given that banks are relatively large, and 
will probably be bailed-out, effective PCA requires sufficient commitment by the regulator to 
intervene. Such policies should aim at enhancing the chances of an orderly wind-down, while 
shifting the cost of bad bank management to shareholders and non-senior creditors. 
Given that most assets on banks’ balance sheets are non-tradable, the lender of last resort 
function of the central bank needs to be able to provide liquidity based on the collateral value of 
such assets. A thorough assessment of assets that might one day be used as collateral could 
facilitate this process. 
As in Isolated Islands, banks are again crucial in financing SMEs investments. The 
government can reduce the fallout from reduced bank lending by guaranteeing the loans made 
to such firms.  
5.3  Competing Conglomerates  
In the competing conglomerates scenario, the most important market failures are 
interconnectedness and failing corporate governance. Compared with the other scenarios, 
government failures are particularly threatening. Commitment is difficult; capture is real threat; 
and coordination problematic. The competing conglomerates scenario is challenging for 
policymakers because they need to create the right tools to get a grip on the large foreign banks 
that dominate the local banking system, while at the same time reducing these government 
failures. Hence, arrangements between supervisors are important, but not likely to secure a firm 
grip on the local system as local supervisors have less information than foreign home 
supervisors. In this scenario, monitoring of risk is likely to be difficult and subject to large 
uncertainty. Policies should therefore concentrate on ex post interventions.   73 
Monitoring financial stability 
Because most banks are in foreign hands, monitoring the stability of the local financial system 
requires an assessment of the risks to which these banks expose themselves. For a local 
supervisor, a comprehensive assessment of these banks’ risks is difficult, as only the home 
supervisors can closely watch all activities of such an international banking conglomerate. In 
addition, supervisors need detailed information about the interconnectedness of the financial 
system as a whole in order to assess systemic risk. This requires information not only about the 
foreign banks active in their country, but also information on these banks exposure to other 
foreign banks not active in their country, the latter’s exposure etc. This implies that supervisors 
have difficulties in overseeing all risks to the local banking system. Hence, threats to local 
financial stability are hard to anticipate and difficult to prevent.  
The more geographically diversified nature of banks’ assets limits exposure to local 
macroeconomic shocks. Global shocks, however, remain a potential threat to stability. While 
bank runs will always be a risk, contagion through information spillovers is less likely if banks 
differ from one another. In this sense, an internationally diversified banking system might be 
helpful for securing financial stability. 
As the financial system is not fully bank-based, policies to guarantee its stability should 
have a wider scope as well. Important non-bank market participants should be subject to some 
regulation that favours the functioning of markets, such as transparency of their portfolios or the 
restriction from dominating a certain market. In addition, because many firms tap financial 
markets directly contingency tools for malfunctioning markets should also be available. 
Finally, the regulator can design financial instruments that complement their activities in 
monitoring financial stability. For example, they may force banks to issue contingent capital 
that converts into equity when certain systemic events occur. The market prices of these 
instruments may complement other indicators of systemic risk. 
Reducing government failure 
Since banks can easily relocate activities to other countries in this scenario, they have 
significant bargaining power. Politician and civil servants are perceptive to banks’ arguments 
because having a large international bank gives more influence in international policy matters. 
In addition, policymakers are often convinced that national banks are better able to serve and 
promote the interests of national firms, although we are not aware of evidence in this direction. 
An independent regulator, i.e., free from political pressures, is an essential bulwark against 
political pressures. 
The footlooseness of international conglomerates also fuels competition between countries 
to host these banks, which undermines coordination. To reduce systemic risk, governments 
should be prepared to unilaterally implement regulation. Examples are Spain and Canada, who 
unilaterally implemented policy measures that reduced the impact of a systemic crisis in their   74 
countries.
31 Countries could also try to devise mechanisms to punish deviators. For example, 
based on rankings of regulatory toughness, banks from certain countries could face higher 
capital requirements. 
Another solution would be to require a foreign bank to be more “local”. For example, 
supervisors could require a local branch of a foreign bank becomes a full-fletched local 
subsidiary if it reaches a certain scale. This would enhance the power to impose measures and 
acquire information of the local supervisors. A different measure could be the requirement that 
a foreign bank that attracts local deposits, invests a certain percentage of these deposits in the 
local economy. The idea is that these assets can be used to repay local claimants in the event of 
a default. In addition, supervisors could require banks to keep a minimum balance of liquid 
assets deposited at the local central bank. Note that in a European context such measures may 
conflict with the goal of a free internal market. Of course, if countries within the European 
Union would succeed in coordinating ex ante and especially ex post policies, these measures 
would not be necessary with regard to banks within the EU. In case of non-EU banks, such 
policies would be feasible.  
An important additional challenge in this scenario is capture. Large conglomerates are very 
well organised internationally and lobby politicians into lowering regulatory standards. In 
addition, large complex financial institutions have an information advantage over supervisors. 
Independence should therefore be combined with an institutional design that prevents 
forbearance and capture. Possible routes towards this goal are allocating oversight and 
intervention to independent entities. This may help to reduce regulatory forbearance as the 
intervention authority would not take into account any reputational concerns of the monitoring 
authority. Market-based comply-or-explain that trigger intervention by the supervisor also help 
to reduce regulatory forbearance. A regulator will have to intervene in some way when external 
indicators reach a certain level. Combined with a regular external visitation of a supervisor’s 
activities (including those activities that are not public), this is a potent mechanism to reduce the 
adverse effects of regulatory capture. 
Ex ante prudential supervision 
In this scenario, banks’ assets are relatively liquid and less opaque. Supervisors should therefore 
try to price risk and make optimal use of market information. However, due to the complexity 
of banks’ balance sheets and banks’ large size, pricing risk through risk-adjusted capital ratios 
 
31 Banco de España put dynamic provisions into place in July 2000, to cope with a sharp increase in credit risk on Spanish 
banks’ balance sheets following a period of significant credit growth. The unweighted leverage ratio of Canadian banks has 
been restricted since the early 1980s. The regulatory measure of leverage in Canada is the ratio of total balance-sheet 
assets and certain off-balance-sheet items to total regulatory capital (adjusted net Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital). The off-balance-
sheet items in this measure cover all direct contractual exposures to credit risk – including letters of credit and guarantees, 
transaction-related contingencies, trade-related contingencies, and sale and repurchase agreements.   75 
may not be sufficient to reign in the risk appetite of these international conglomerates. In that 
case, more quantitative restrictions may be called for. 
Because banks compete in a global market, competition for scarce talented bankers is fierce 
in this scenario. This may result in bonus schemes giving too much risk-taking incentives. To 
curb the effect of global competition for the limited number of top talented traders, supervisors 
should consider regulating bankers’ performance incentive schemes.  
In addition, prudential supervisors depend very much on foreign home supervisors for their 
information. This constitutes a risk, as supervisors tend to keep sensitive and confidential 
information to themselves. A way to reduce this problem is the recent initiative to create 
colleges of supervisors per bank, which include supervisors from all countries where a bank is 
active. This might help to share information more freely between these supervisors, placing the 
host supervisors on an equal footing. 
Ex post crisis management 
In this scenario, financial stability policies should focus on measures that reduce the 
consequences of the failure of large foreign banks, rather than seek to prevent them. Crisis 
management policies are difficult to implement if a bank resides in a foreign country. First, 
foreign supervisors will have the lead in conducting such policies, which places the local host 
supervisor in a dependent position. Second, when a bank is under distress, information becomes 
extremely sensitive, and it is very likely that the foreign home supervisors are not willing to 
share all information they possess about a bank. This increases the information disadvantage of 
local supervisors even further, in times when their need accurate information is highest. Third, 
there might be conflicts of interests between the local and foreign supervisors, for example 
because both have an interest in channelling funds to their jurisdiction. Within this context, 
local supervisors should make ex ante arrangements that give them the means to intervene in a 
local branch when a mother bank faces difficulties. In this regard, one could think of the 
possibility of separating a local branch from its foreign branches. 
Another option to deal with large foreign banks is to reduce their systemic importance for 
the local financial system. This can be done by measures such as placing the payment system 
outside the bank, requiring banks to have a living will, and enhancing the possibilities for 
prompt corrective action by the local supervisor. The latter will be difficult to arrange in the 
case of a foreign bank. 
 Because many assets are tradable in this scenario, they have a clear collateral value, which 
facilitates the lender of last resort function. However, emergency liquidity assistance will 
normally also be arranged by the foreign central bank in the country where the bank resides. 
This implies that a local branch depends on the mother bank for liquidity assistance. Such a 
situation might not be optimal for preserving the operations of a local branch. Another option 
would be to give the local central bank a role in proving liquidity to a local branch, where local 
assets can be used as collateral.   76 
5.4  Flat Finance 
In Flat Finance, interconnectedness is the most important market failure and coordination is the 
most important government failure. Capture and commitment are significant issues, but less so 
than in competing conglomerates. International cooperation is the big challenge. Coordination 
is essential to tackle systemic risk,, but at the same time difficult due to banks’ mobility.  
Monitoring financial stability 
In Flat Finance, internationally active and specialized banks are heavily interconnected through 
international financial markets and through their common exposures to macroeconomic 
developments in different countries. Within such a globally interconnected system, crises come 
from the outside. A problem somewhere in the macroeconomic or financial system can spread 
through contagion in an unpredictable manner. Therefore, it will be virtually impossible to take 
ex ante measures that prevent a crisis from spilling over into the national financial system.  
Since international financial markets play an important role in this scenario, financial 
stability monitoring should include the assessment of markets. The perimeter of financial 
regulation could be extended to non-bank financial institutions that are active in financial 
markets, such as hedge funds, investment banks, and money market funds. Because financial 
institutions can shift their activities to other countries or to other types of (non-regulated) 
entities, it is not the specific institution that matters, but the activity it is involved with. 
Finally, the regulator can design financial instruments that complement their activities in 
monitoring financial stability. For example, they may force banks to issue contingent capital 
that converts into equity when certain systemic events occur. The market prices of these 
instruments may complement other indicators of systemic risk. 
Reducing government failure 
As banks can easily relocate their business, countries that increase prudential standards or 
become stricter in their implementation, might see some banks leaving. This will especially be 
the case for regulation that reduces bank profits, such as a banking tax or limits on banking 
activities. Although some rules, such as high capital or liquidity buffers, may also help banks in 
signalling their quality, there is large risk that supervisors are caught in a prisoners’ dilemma. 
While everyone benefits from reducing systemic risk, unilateral deviation may be profitable, 
because a country that undercuts certain standards will become an attractive place for banks. To 
escape this dilemma, international cooperation is crucial. But for the same reason international 
cooperation is difficult to achieve.  
In addition, many of the measures described in Competing Conglomerates are important as 
well, like using institutional design to reduce probability of capture, using market information 
to trigger intervention, making banks ‘more local’, or devise mechanisms to punish deviating 
countries.   77 
Ex ante prudential supervision 
If international cooperation is not successful in tightening banking standards, there are still 
measures that local authorities can take unilaterally. An important national policy measure can 
be reorganising the local DGS in such a way that it can cope with the many foreign banks active 
in the local market. For example, one may require foreign banks to provide some form of 
collateral proportional to the amount of local deposits. In addition, the national payment system 
and rules governing banks’ conduct of business still fall within the realm of local regulators.  
The interconnected nature of this scenario also implies that there are many spillover effects 
within the financial system. As individual banks tend not to take into account these negative 
spillover effects of their actions on other banks or markets, regulators should introduce systemic 
risk charges to try to compensate for such effects. Examples are fees related to the size or 
interconnectedness of a bank, or liquidity charges based on the maturity mismatch of a bank. 
Measures that reduce interconnectedness should also have priority in this scenario. The use of 
CCP clearing in derivatives markets is an obvious example. Because banks compete in a global 
market, competition for scarce talented bankers is fierce in this scenario. This may result in 
bonus schemes giving too much risk-taking incentives. Regulation of performance pay may 
then help to reduce risk. 
In this scenario, financial markets play a large role in financing banks. Supervisors can use 
these active markets in their day-to-day monitoring. If supervisors would require banks to issue 
contingent capital, the price of these bonds could be an important monitoring instrument in 
addition to regular monitoring activities. In addition, market signals can also serve a useful role 
in disciplining supervisors, for example by obliging a supervisor to intervene when a certain 
market-based trigger reaches a pre-defined threshold. This will reduce the risk of forbearance.  
Ex post crisis management 
Because it is difficult to see a crisis coming in this scenario, and thus to prevent it, measures to 
manage a crisis are an important tool to reduce the fallout of such an event. Hence, prompt 
corrective action frameworks, lender of last resort facilities and measures to secure the 
functioning of fundamental banking functions, such as the payment system, should be 
enhanced. 
A difficulty in doing so is that in this scenario the financial sector consists of both local and 
foreign banks. This implies that some measures, for example aimed at corrective action, will be 
less effective. This instrument will largely be in the hands of the foreign supervisor. Therefore, 
crisis management measures also require international cooperation, such as ex ante 
arrangements between the foreign home and the local host supervisors, on how to dismantle or 
to support a bank and on how to share the costs of doing so. Because home and host supervisors 
can have different interests, while the local supervisor has an information disadvantage, 
measures that ring fence or secure local operations might be an alternative route to reduce the 
negative effects of a failing foreign bank. In addition, the local government could consider   78 
following its own policies as regards DGS for Dutch citizens, bank-specific bankruptcy laws, or 
safety of the payment system. These are local affairs.  
The interconnected financial system is a challenge to crisis management. In this regard, it is 
especially important to understand how a certain rescue measure, such as reducing creditor 
rights, will affect other banks. The failure of Lehman Brothers is a good example, of how an 
interconnected firm posses risks to the stability of the system as a whole. Supervisors should be 
aware of such interconnections when deciding to take certain measures or not. 
The reliance on markets for funding implies that the lender of last resort function of the 
central bank should be adapted to a situation where liquidity risks arise from both bank runs and 
a liquidity freeze in markets. Given the importance of markets, enhancing the financial 
infrastructure, for example, through the imposition of central counterparty clearing for OTC 
derivate trades, standardisation of contracts, and enhancing international payment and security 
settlement systems is certainly valuable. These are measures to reduce the risks associated with 
an interconnected system. In this scenario, policymakers also need to think about contingency 





















   79 
5.5  Summary 
Table 5.1 summarizes the challenges faced by policymakers in our four scenarios. 
Table 5.1   Policy challenges 




Ex ante prudential 
supervision 
Ex post crisis 
management  
         
II  * Focus on local risks, 
correlated exposures,  
information spillovers 
* Monitor different types 
of financial institutions 
* Market information as 
indicator of trust 
* Transparent reporting by 
regulator (see FDIC)  
 
* Complement incentive 
regulation with simple 
indicators that trigger 
close scrutiny 
* Guarantee independent 
board 
* PCA works well  
* Facilitate crisis 
funding for SMEs 
         
BB  * Focus on local risks, 
correlated exposures, 
information spillovers 
* Use information other 
local banks 
* Market information as 
indicator of trust 
* Split monitoring and 
intervention 
* Arrange external 
visitation 
* Prevent long-term 
relation between regulator 
and banks 
* Use simple indicators 
that trigger close scrutiny 
* Guarantee independent 
board 
* Put more emphasis on 
quantitative restrictions 
* Adapt PCA to large 
national banks 
* Facilitate crisis 
funding for SMEs 
         
CC  * International 
monitoring of macro and 
micro exposure 
important 
* Focus on information 
spillovers  
* Design markets to 
generate information on 
systemic risk 
* Use institutional design 
to reduce probability of 
capture (see Big Banks) 
* Use market information 
to trigger intervention 
* Act unilaterally  
* Make banks ‘more local’ 
* Devise mechanisms to 
punish deviating countries 
* Price systemic risk,  
* Complement pricing with 
quantitative restrictions. 
* Use market discipline 
* Regulate incentive 
schemes 
* Adapt PCA to large 
international banks  
* Isolate crucial 
banking functions 
from crisis  




* Introduce bank- 
specific bankruptcy 
law 
         
FF  * International 
monitoring of macro and 
micro exposure 
important 
* Focus on 
interconnectedness  
* Focus on activities 
instead of institutions 
* Design markets to 
generate information on 
systemic risk 
* Use institutional design 
to reduce probability of 
capture (see Big Banks) 
* Use market information 
to trigger intervention  
* Act unilaterally  
* Make banks ‘more local’ 
* Devise mechanisms to 
punish deviating countries 
* Price systemic risk 
* Use market discipline 
* Regulate incentive 
schemes 
* Adapt PCA to large 
international banks  
* Isolate crucial 
banking functions 
from crisis 




* Introduce bank- 
specific bankruptcy 
law 
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6  Conclusion 
We have presented four scenarios for the future of finance. Our scenarios differ in two 
dimensions. First, to what extent soft information lies at the core of banks’ business model. 
Second, to what extent scope economies exist between different banking activities. By 
combining these two dimensions, we have obtained four scenarios: Isolated Islands, Big Banks, 
Competing Conglomerates, and Flat Finance. 
The focus of our study is on the challenges faced by policymakers in reducing systemic risk. 
Important determinants of these challenges are: the extent of international coordination feasible, 
the information gap between the regulator and banks, the possibility for market discipline to 
complement regulation, the ability to identify risks to financial stability at an early stage, the 
potential for regulatory capture, and the size of bank. From the challenges discussed in section 
5, we think that policymakers should draw several lessons.  
Improved financial infrastructure helps 
Strengthening financial infrastructure helps in reducing systemic risk. One example is the use of 
central counter party clearing in international OTC markets. But changes in financial 
infrastructure at the national level can also reduce risks. An important issue is how to secure the 
continuity of (retail) payment services when a bank defaults. This requires that a bank’s 
payment system is isolated in case of the bank’s failure or that a public system is ready to step 
in. In this way, the payment system is treated more like a utility and local control over it is 
ensured, even if most banks are foreign. 
Countries may not succeed in coordinating policy 
In Isolated Islands and Big Banks, international coordination is called for only on specific 
issues such as deposit guarantee schemes, or the identification of macroeconomic threats. 
International policy coordination becomes more important in the Competing Conglomerates and 
Flat Finance scenarios, where the banking system is more international and banks are footloose. 
In that case, however, reaching international agreement on tough regulation for banks will also 
be more difficult because individual countries will be able to attract banks by loosening 
regulatory standards (“light touch” regulation) relative to others. In the presence of such free 
rider effects, international coordination will not result in sufficiently strict regulation of 
systemic risk.  
Under such circumstances, countries should consider unilateral policies. One can think of 
regulation that enhances transparency or that provides governments with proper crisis 
management tools. An example is the unilateral implementation of bank-specific bankruptcy 
law that allows the government to expropriate shareholders and put systemic risk above the 
interests of the banks’ financiers.   82 
The potential to coordinate differs between policy initiatives. Some initiatives, such as 
regulation of credit rating agencies or regulating OTC markets, are relatively easy to realise 
because such agencies are located mainly in one country (the US) or because the gains from 
providing a loose regime are limited. Other issues, such as the regulation of performance pay, 
the deflating of potentially disrupting asset bubbles, the convergence of accounting standards, 
the realisation of burden sharing rules, or the implementation of a unified systemic risk tax, are 
subject to free-rider effects that make successful coordination more difficult. 
Policies should be designed to deal with government failure 
Another lesson is that fighting government failure should play a crucial role in devising policies 
to deal with future financial crises. Not surprisingly, policymakers often take this lesson lightly. 
Reducing government failures such as forbearance by supervisors, gambling for resurrection by 
regulators or regulatory capture is important in reducing market failures. The risk of 
government failures is high when the banking sector is concentrated, when the complexity of 
banks is high, and when banks can credibly threat to relocate (some) of their activities. Hence, 
in scenarios where banks are big (Big Banks and Competing Conglomerates) or when financial 
products are complex (Competing Conglomerates and Flat Finance), policymakers should put 
greater weight on preventing government failures.  
A measure to reduce the risk of forbearance is to introduce regular audit by an external third 
party. A more far-reaching option would be to separate bank supervision and intervention, but 
this requires that both decision bodies should have access to the same, often confidential 
information. More in general, if different regulatory bodies perform different tasks, they can 
monitor each other to some extent and thereby reduce regulatory capture. As an example, new 
legislation in the UK introduced a Special Resolution Regime that allows banks to be sold to 
private parties, nationalised, or put into receivership. The responsibility for deciding whether 
the regime applies rests with one government agency, the Financial Services Authority. The 
responsibility for the subsequent procedure, however, rests with other government agencies (the 
Bank of England or the Treasury, depending on the choice of procedure). 
Another measure could be to strengthen markets in a way that helps to generate information 
on bank risk, and to incorporate such market-based information in supervision. In this way, 
society will be less reliant on the benevolence and omnipotence of the supervisor as anchor for 
stability. In scenarios such as Competing Conglomerates and Flat Finance, where markets play 
a dominate role in financing the economy, there is scope to use the disciplining function of 
markets, not only to discipline financial intermediaries, but also to trigger the regulator. If 
financial markets function well, because participants are well informed and know they cannot 
transfer credit risk to governments, market information can be used to discipline regulators. 
Prompt corrective action measures could be coupled to different levels of indicators of a bank’s 
credit or liquidity risk. For example, a supervisor could be obliged to perform a stress test when 
a bank’s CDS spreads hits some pre-defined level, or to couple.   83 
Furthermore, measures that reduce the size or the complexity of banks (such as systemic risk 
charges related to bank’s size or complexity), or measures that restrict bank’s activities (such as 
the Volcker Rule) can also reduce government failures. Such arrangements can not only help to 
manage a crisis, but also to change expectations and thus the risk-taking behaviour of banks.  
Ex post measures may be more effective than ex ante regulation  
Preventing shocks to the banking system is more likely to be successful when the banking 
system is locally oriented, as is the case in the Isolated Islands and Big Banks scenarios. As 
potential threats to the banking sector stem from within the local economy or the local financial 
system itself, there is a relatively large chance that local supervisory authorities can identify 
such threats at an early stage. Hence, measures that reduce these risks are also more likely to be 
effective. An example cap the loan-to-value ratio for new mortgages, which reduces the 
probability of defaults and mitigates asset bubbles.  
Such preventive policies are less effective if the banking system is international and thus the 
domain of potential threats is much larger. While bank supervisors can in principle use the 
balance sheets of domestic banks to identify exposures, and hence to analyse potential threats, 
this is a much harder task when exposures are international. Can we expect the Dutch 
supervisors to make a reliable estimate of potential losses for a bank stemming from its 
exposure to the US commercial real estate market, to car loans in Brazil, or to some NY-based 
hedge fund? Clearly, these are much more challenging tasks than monitoring exposures to the 
local economy. Therefore, prevention is likely to be less effective in this more international 
setting and makers should anticipate unexpected shocks to the banking system. This requires a 
stronger focus on ex post measure, such as PCA, reaching ex ante international agreements on 
crisis resolution and contingency planning.  
Governments should prepare to cope with big foreign banks 
Bank supervision, crisis resolution and monitoring financial stability will change profoundly 
when the banking systems consists predominantly of large foreign banks. In several scenarios, 
Dutch regulators and politicians should prepare themselves for the foreign takeover of Dutch 
banks, both large and small. Here the central question is how to keep grip on the local financial 
system once it is in foreign hands.  
One approach is to require foreign banks to become more local, by establishing local 
subsidiaries, through ring-fencing of assets, and by managing liquidity and capital requirements 
on a local basis. This would the grip of local authorities on such banks. Still, an effective PCA 
mechanism will be difficult to implement if the most probable cause of bankruptcy is the 
default of a foreign mother bank. 
Another approach is to make international arrangements with the foreign authorities in the 
country where the mother bank resides. In that case, one can strive for a coordinated PCA 
framework and make arrangements on burden sharing. If this works, it is the optimal strategy,   84 
but it also carries risks. The foreign supervisor will be better informed and may not always 
share the most sensitive information with local authorities, especially not when a bank is in 
trouble and different countries’ interests may differ. Hence, the local supervisors need to be able 
to trust the ex ante arrangements with foreign supervisors.  
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